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This thesis examines which variables give terrorists their will to fight in order to 
determine if such motivations can be eroded through a counterterrorist campaign. 
Drawing from the expansive literature on the causes of terrorism, and using Bertalanffy’s 
theory of open systems, the study posits that the will to fight is a function of the 
following variables: a belief in a cause, a desire for revenge, a search for satisfaction 
(reputation, joy, and money), and cultural attributes.  
The thesis tests these variables through the use of a longitudinal case study of the 
rise and fall of the Sendero Luminoso—Shining Path—and its will to fight. It finds that 
religious beliefs and desire for revenge were particularly important in this case. Building 
on these findings, this thesis recommends specific strategies that aim to undermine 
terrorists’ will to fight by identifying the key variables and their level of influence on 
terrorists’ will to fight: making all instruments of statecraft work in unison; adapting to 
the situation on an ongoing basis; being consistent; and not overreacting.  
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 I. INTRODUCTION 





There are only a few topics in security studies that have been as thoroughly 
studied as terrorism. Nevertheless, the vast majority of the available literature focuses on 
the symptoms of the problem, not on its causes. Moreover, most militaries still have a 
classical war mindset—focusing on destroying the enemy—an approach that has shown 
itself ineffective against terrorism. This thesis will hypothesize that it is not only 
necessary to manipulate the means available to the terrorists, but also the conditions that 
may influence their will to fight. 
A. BACKGROUND 
According to the U.S. Department of State, there are more than 50 significant 
terrorist organizations active around the world.1 These groups pose a threat not only to 
the countries they claim to be fighting, but to any country that has people or assets related 
to the countries they target, particularly the ones that are responsible for holding 
international meetings or competitions.2 For instance, the Black September terrorist 
attack in Munich during the 1972 Olympics—in which 11 Israeli athletes were kidnapped 
and murdered—is unforgettable and demonstrates that terrorists can attack virtually 
anywhere in the world. Globalization has led to porous borders and ease of travel has 
shortened the distances among states; technology, in turn, has facilitated terrorist 
operations by providing, for instance, easy, fast, and cheap means of communication, 
transportation, and financing. All of these factors have made preventing and fighting 
terrorism a top security concern. 
1 U.S. Department of State, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” September 28, 2012, 
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm. 
2 Brazil will hold the World Cup this year and the Olympics in 2016. 
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 Most countries that have faced terrorism in the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries react fiercely against it, particularly following deadly attacks. For instance, the 
U.S. reaction to the September 11 attacks was to declare a Global War on Terror. “The 
Bush administration focused on dealing with the military capabilities of terrorist 
organizations while attacking their installations, bases, financing sources and the 
operatives, as well as attacking the regimes providing shelter and support to terrorist 
organizations.”3 
However, after almost 12 years of fighting and the death of Osama bin Laden, al-
Qaeda is still operational. According to the British Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, “Osama bin Laden may be dead, but the threat from Al Qa’ida inspired 
terrorism is not.”4 More recently, on August, 4, 2013, the U.S. Government announced 
the closure of 25 embassies and consulates in Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Middle 
East. Judging by the actions that were taken, Al-Qaeda’s capabilities are still considered 
hazardous as stated by Mike Rogers, the intelligence committee chairman: “The 
seriousness of the threat stream is a sober reminder of al Qaeda’s determination and 
ongoing intention to commit acts of violence on Western and U.S. targets.”5 
This traditional strategy has prioritized the use of force to deal with terrorism. The 
problem with this approach is that the military machine understands that the best way to 
solve the problem is by destroying the enemy’s forces and, since the enemy is a non-state 
actor, this will be accomplished by decapitation of the leadership—in the case of 
important key leaders—or by targeting the terrorists’ organizations or networks. The 
logic behind this strategy is that killing terrorist leaders and destroying their networks 
will stop terrorist attacks. However, such an approach will not be effective if the 
terrorists’ rate of recruitment is higher than the military ability to eliminate terrorists. And 
3 Boaz Ganor, “The U.S. Counterterrorism Policy – The Calm before the Storm,” International 
Institute for Counter-Terrorism, September 11, 2011, http://www.ict.org.il/NewsCommentaries 
/Commentaries/tabid/69/Articlsid/982/currentpage/8/Default.aspx.  
4 United Kingdom, HM Government, Prevent Strategy (Norwich, UK: TSO, June 2011). 
5 Tony Capra, Andrea Mitchell, and Catherine Chomiak, “Al Qaeda Threat is ‘Real and Serious’ – 




                                                 
 as some excesses are made by the state, new grievances arise and the problem never 
ceases. The terrorists’ will to fight in such cases may even grow stronger. Tore Bjørgo 
argues that this “one-sided focus on military means and repressive responses may become 
a greater threat to civil society.”6 
In June 2011, the United States announced a shift in its approach from one of 
leadership targeting to a new strategy “to diminish specific drivers and grievances.”7 In 
practice, however, it has been quite difficult to identify this change. Ben Bordurian 
argues, “The Obama administration, while stressing the importance of democracy and 
human rights, generally avoids theoretical discussions of the root drivers of terrorism 
[emphasis added]. Instead, the 2011 document largely focuses on what the government 
and its international partners are doing operationally to combat al Qaeda’s central 
apparatus in South Asia, its regional affiliates in the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast 
Asia, and its followers across the world, including in the United States and Europe.”8 The 
problem is that the root drivers may also provide terrorists with the will to fight; if they 
are misidentified and different variables are targeted, a state’s counterterrorism strategy 
will not be effective. In fact, it could lead to increasing the terrorists’ will to fight. 
Carl von Clausewitz states that to defeat your adversary “you must match your 
effort against his power of resistance, which can be expressed as the product of two 
inseparable factors, the total means at his disposal and the strength of his will.”9 Building 
on such observation, this thesis hypothesizes that terrorists’ power of resistance (T) is 
given by the equation T = mw, where (m) represents the terrorists’ resources and (w) is 
the strength of their will to fight. If this globalized world has made it even more difficult 
to intercept all the resources available for terrorists (m), a better strategy may be achieved 
6 Tore Bjørgo, ed., preface to Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward (New 
York: Routledge, 2005), xvii. 
7 Barack Obama, National Strategy for Counterterrorism (Washington, DC: White House, June 2011), 
10. 
8 Ben Bodurian, “The New National Strategy for Counterterrorism,” Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, June 30, 2011, http://csis.org/publication/new-national-strategy-counterterrorism.  
9 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1976), 16. 
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 by manipulating (w).10 The result of a small amount of means times a weak will to fight 
should be a reduction of terrorism activities. According to Martha Crenshaw, these 
variables may be identifiable: “If there are consistent patterns in terrorist behavior, rather 
than random idiosyncrasies, a strategic analysis may reveal them. Prediction of future 
terrorism can only be based on theories that explain past patterns.”11 
B. PURPOSE 
Clausewitz was not the only one to acknowledge the importance of the will to 
fight in a battle. According to Napoleon, “the moral is to the physical as three to one.”12 
Mao stated that his forces “absolutely must not relax in the least their will to fight; any 
thinking that relaxes the will to fight and belittles the enemy is wrong.”13 RAND 
researchers also recognize the importance of the will to fight in insurgency campaigns. 
Their studies demonstrated that if a counterinsurgency force does not have the will to win 
the conflict, they will eventually lose, even if they are sponsored by powerful forces with 
a strong will. In other words: if they do not want to win, one cannot win for them.14 
These observations highlight the great significance of the human will in a contest. 
Terrorism is a strategy used by the weak to fight the strong. Non-state terrorists fight 
from an inferior position in respect to the state; nevertheless, there are dozens of active 
terrorist groups throughout the world. It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that in order 
to continue fighting against these odds, terrorists must have a strong will to balance the 
equation. 
10 The equation uses Clausewitz’s assertion that the enemy power of resistance is expressed by the 
product of the total means at his disposal and the strength of his will. Clausewitz, On War, 16. 
11 Martha Crenshaw, “The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice,” 
in Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, ed. Walter Reich 
(Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998), 24. 
12 B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), 25. 
13 Mao Tse-Tung and Zedong Mao, “Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China, March 5, 1949” in Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, Vol. IV 
(San Francisco: China Books, 1972), 361.  
14 Christopher Paul et al., Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2013), xxix. 
 4 
                                                 
 Furthermore, terrorists design their actions with the purpose of breaking their 
adversary’s will to fight: “. . .  insurgents engaged in urban violence all pursue the 
intermediate aim of eroding the government’s will to resist.”15 This is a logical and 
mandatory adaptation to the environment they face; terrorists either pursue such a goal or 
vanish, because this is their best chance of winning. The question then becomes: How can 
states effectively reduce (w) to truly insignificant values? Here lies the purpose of this 
thesis: to study what translates grievances into the will to conduct terrorism and, in turn, 
how to counter those variables with an effective strategy that breaks the will of terrorists. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The objective of this thesis is to answer these questions: What gives terrorists the 
will to fight? Can this will be eroded, and will this result in a reduction of terrorism? 
The following nested questions will be used to assist in responding to the primary 
research questions:  
1.  What is the traditional strategy used against terrorism? Does it work? If 
not, what points are missing or what are its problems? 
2.  Under what conditions do terrorists acquire their will to fight? What is the 
relationship between grievances and the will to fight? If grievances are 
minimized or removed, will terrorist actions decline, suggesting a 
weakening of their will? 
3.  Is there a threshold for grievances that needs to be exceeded in order to 
trigger terrorist actions or instill in them the will to fight? 
4.  What would a good approach for reducing terrorism look like? 
  
15 Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare (Washington, DC: 
Brassey’s, 1990), 46. 
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 D. HYPOTHESIS AND THESIS SCOPE 
Based on the background of the subject and the research questions, this thesis 
intends to examine the validity of the following propositions: 
1.  Grievances have a direct relationship with terrorists’ will to fight. 
2.  Breaking the terrorists’ will to fight will mitigate terrorism. 
3.  A more holistic approach designed to reduce not only (m) but also (w) is 
likely to work better in the long run than an approach which primarily 
targets (m) by the use of military and repressive means. 
The scope of this thesis will consider only terrorist actions perpetrated by non-
state actors against states. Terrorism used by criminal organizations that do not aim to 
“see the formal state disappear,”16 but “to maintain equilibrium between the public or 
institutional state and the privatized interests of the mafia state”17 are therefore beyond 
the scope of the thesis. The analysis will be conducted at the leadership and group levels. 
Finally, the timeframe of this study will be limited to the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
First, this thesis will use qualitative methods in order to investigate the conditions 
and variables that give terrorists the will to fight. This thesis will also draw on 
Bertalanffy’s theory of open systems to propose a theory of the conditions under which 
terrorists lose their will to fight.  
Second, the thesis will process-trace one longitudinal case study—the Shining 
Path—in order to test this theory and the variables that affected the rise and fall of the 
Shining Path’s popularity and will to fight in Peru. Although it is quite difficult to 
measure human behavior, it is possible to identify and analyze the factors that have some 
influence on the study variable; this is the aim of this thesis using the wealth of primary 
and secondary data available on this group. 
16 Alison Jamieson, “The Use of Terrorism by Organized Crime,” in Root Causes of Terrorism: 
Myths, Reality and Ways Forward, ed. Tore Bjørgo (New York: Routledge, 2005), 165. 
17 Ibid. 
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 Third, this thesis will build on its case-study process tracing to propose a list of 
tactics and operations that ought to be present in a counterterrorism strategy that aims to 
undermine the will of terrorists to fight. 
F. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
This study suggests that the will to fight is a function of a belief in a cause, be it a 
religion, an ideology, ethnicity, or values; a desire for revenge; a search for satisfaction 
(renown, joy, or financial incentives), and cultural traits. The investigation finds that 
religious beliefs and desire for revenge were the most influential variables in the case of 
Sendero Luminoso and that the will to fight may significantly change over time. 
The thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter II presents a brief history of terrorism, 
defines the term as it shall be understood in this thesis, and depicts terrorism with the lens 
under which it will be analyzed. In Chapter III the will to fight is defined, its importance 
in terrorism is highlighted, the variables that generate it are identified, and a model that 
correlates the variables of the will to fight with terrorism is offered. Chapter IV provides 
a case study of Sendero Luminoso’s will to fight based on the model proposed on the 
previous chapter. The final chapter displays the conclusions found and offers 
recommendations for reducing terrorists’ will to fight. 
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 II. TERRORISM 
Pinpointing the causes of terrorism throughout history is a very controversial 
undertaking. Moreover, the term itself has more than 200 definitions.18 Therefore, it is 
important to provide a history on the subject to present certain definitions used by some 
respected scholars, to define the term as it shall be understood in this thesis, and to depict 
terrorism with the lens under which it will be analyzed. 
A. A BRIEF OVERVIEW ON THE HISTORY OF TERRORISM 
Terrorism is not a problem known only to our times; in fact, it is a recurrent 
problem that can be traced back for millennia. Furthermore, the establishment of a 
starting point for terrorism depends on how the word is understood as well as on the 
existence of written accounts that support it. If one assumes that the objective of 
terrorism is to spread fear by intentionally attacking noncombatants in order to influence 
behavior, then Caleb Carr argues that the Romans are to be considered the first ones to 
employ the strategy systematically.19  
The complete destruction of Carthage by Rome in 146 BC led to “the utter 
eradication not only of the enemy’s home but of many if not most of his people as well: 
men, women, children, even the elderly,”20 in order to serve as an example to other 
peoples of the possible consequences of not complying with Roman policies. Another 
example is the crucifixion of about 6,000 of Spartacus’ companions along the Appian 
Way’s route from Capua to Rome in 71 BC.21 In both cases, terror was spread from 
above: it was employed by the Empire against the weak.  
  
18 Bjørgo, ed., Root Causes of Terrorism, 1. 
19 Caleb Carr, The Lessons of Terror: A History of Warfare against Civilians (New York: Random 
House, 2003), 17. 
20 Ibid., 18. 
21 Gus Martin, Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives, and Issues (Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage Publications, 2010), 23. 
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 Nevertheless, most scholars point out that terrorism arose in the first century AD, 
when the Zealots used the sica—a short sword or a large dagger—to spread fear among 
Roman occupiers in Palestine. They were a group of Judean extremists who believed 
“that they had to account to God alone”22 and whose targets were not only Roman 
citizens, but any supporter of the occupiers. Louise Richardson notes that their “preferred 
tactic was to mingle in the crowds at a festival or other large gathering, locate their 
opponent, pull a concealed dagger from beneath their clothes, stab their victim, and then 
disappear back into the crowd.”23 
About a thousand years later, the Assassins became known for spreading terror 
throughout the Middle East. Rooted in Iran and Syria, they were a Shia Muslim sect 
whose objective was to “reconstitute Islam as a single religious entity”24 and whose 
targets were Muslim elites and Westerners (mainly Crusaders).25 They habitually 
infiltrated towns or villages and, over time, established personal connections with their 
targets so they could either stab them in public26 or blackmail their victims. In these two 
cases, terrorism was indeed a strategy used by the weak against the strong.  
Despite these historic examples, the term terrorism was established only in 1793 
by Edmund Burke27 to describe what Robespierre inaugurated as the Régime de la 
Terreur (Reign of Terror): “Subdue by terror the enemies of liberty, and you will be 
right, as founders of the Republic.”28 The Committee of Public Safety, controlled by the 
Jacobins, used the power of the state to send to the guillotine anyone the Revolutionary 
Tribunal found guilty of being against the new ideas introduced by the French 
Revolution. Their intention was clear: “It is necessary that the terror caused by the 
22 Gérard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin, eds., The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to al Qaeda 
(University of California Press, 2007), 56. 
23 Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat (New 
York: Random House, 2007), 24. 
24 Ibid., 26. 
25 Chaliand and Blin, eds., The History of Terrorism, 66‒73. 
26 Richardson, What Terrorists Want, 26. 
27 Martin, Understanding Terrorism, 24. 
28 Maximilien Robespierre, “Justification of the Use of Terror,” in Terrorism: Primary Sources 
(Farmington Hills, MI: Gale, 2009), 47‒54.  
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 guillotine spreads in all of France and brings to justice all the traitors. There is no other 
means to inspire the necessary terror which will consolidate the Revolution.”29 
Key technological developments from the Industrial Revolution, particularly in 
communications, transportation, and chemistry (mainly the invention of dynamite) 
combined with the emergence of a new capitalist order strongly influenced what is 
currently labeled modern terrorism. It started in the late nineteenth century and continues 
today. For David C. Rapoport, this period can be described according to four distinct 
waves: the anarchist or first wave, in his view, started in Russia in the 1880s “with the 
assassination campaigns of prominent officials;”30 the second wave—anticolonial—
started in the 1920s and ended in the 1960s; the third wave became known as the new left 
wave, which is still present in some places and focuses on Marxist/Leninist and separatist 
movements; and the religious wave, which started in 1979.31  
Modern terrorism is the focus of this research because it is the form of violence 
we are confronted with today. Furthermore, in the modern era, terrorism has spread to 
different places of the world, making it an international matter: “similar activities occur 
in several countries, driven by a common predominant energy that shapes the 
participating groups’ characteristics and mutual relationships.”32 
B. DEFINING TERRORISM 
The 2011 Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research provides 261 definitions of 
terrorism. How can such a term have so many different interpretations? Bjørgo argues 
that this is because it “is an extremely complex set of phenomena, covering a great 
diversity of groups with different origins and causes.”33 Another important reason is that 
each stakeholder tries to delineate the term according to his own “priorities and particular 
29 Alex P. Schmid, ed., The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research (New York: Taylor & 
Francis, 2011), 41. 
30 David C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” in Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a 
Grand Strategy, eds. Audrey K. Cronin and James M. Ludes (Washington, DC: Georgetown University 
Press, 2004), 47. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Bjørgo, ed., Root Causes of Terrorism, 1. 
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 interests.”34 Depending on who is providing the definition, terrorism can be a good or a 
bad thing. According to Carlos Marighella: 
A violence or terrorism accusation at the outset has a bad meaning. It has 
acquired a new drapery, a new color. It doesn’t divide, it doesn’t discredit; 
it represents the center of the attraction. Today, to be considered “violent” 
or “terrorist” is a quality that ennobles any honored person, [emphasis 
added] because it is a worthy act of a revolutionary who is engaged in the 
armed struggle against the shameless military dictatorship and its 
atrocities.35 
In the words of Robespierre, “Terror is nothing else than immediate justice, 
severe, inflexible; it is therefore an outflow of virtue, it is not so much a specific principle 
than a consequence of the general principle of democracy applied to the most pressing 
needs of the motherland.”36 For the twentieth century Narodnaya Volya argues, 
“Terroristic activity consists of the destruction of the most harmful persons in the 
government, [emphasis added] the protection of the Party from spies, and the punishment 
of official lawlessness and violence in all the more prominent and important cases where 
it is manifested.”37 It is clear that all of these writers agree that the means justify the ends 
and that their assessments are the correct ones. 
Most countries also have their own definitions, which sometimes differ among 
their ministries, agencies, and departments. Gus Martin states that an American definition 
of the term, combining the U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Code, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, and State Department definitions, should look something like this: 
Terrorism is a premeditated and unlawful act in which groups or agents of 
some principal engage in a threatened or actual use of force or violence 
against human or property targets. These groups or agents engage in this 
behavior intending the purposeful intimidation of governments or people 
to affect policy or behavior with an underlying political objective.38 
34 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 31. 
35 Carlos Marighella, Mini-manual of the Urban Guerrilla, 1969, trans. Paulo E. Santa Barba. 
http://www.anarquismo.com.br/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/carlos-marighella-manual-do-guerrilheiro-
urbano.pdf. 
36 Schmid, The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, 99.  
37 Ibid.  
38 Martin, Understanding Terrorism, 43‒4. 
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 For the Brazilian Armed Forces, terrorism is: 
A form of action that involves the use of physical or psychological 
violence, in a premeditated way, by individuals or groups that may or may 
not be sponsored by States, in order to coerce a government, an authority, 
an individual, a group, or even an entire population to adopt a desired 
behavior. It is motivated and organized by political, ideological, 
economic, environmental, religious or psychosocial reasons.39 
According to Richardson, “Terrorists are substate actors who violently target 
noncombatants to communicate a political message to a third party.”40 Bruce Hoffman 
defines terrorism “as the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or 
the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change. All terrorist acts involve violence 
or the threat of violence.”41 Boaz Ganor maintains that “[t]errorism is a form of violent 
struggle in which violence is deliberately used against civilians in order to achieve 
political goals (nationalistic, socioeconomic, ideological, religious, etc.).”42 Schmid 
provides a revised academic consensus definition of the term as: 
Terrorism refers on the one hand to a doctrine about the presumed 
effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive 
political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of 
calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral 
restraints, targeting mainly civilians and noncombatants, performed for its 
propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and 
conflict parties.43 
In this thesis, terrorism shall be understood as a strategy used by non-state 
actors that involves the threat or the use of premeditated violence against civilians 
to communicate a message to a government in order to achieve a political goal. The 
term civilian, in this case, does not encompass government officials whose exercise of 
authority has direct relationship to the use or the capability to demand the use of 
39 Brazilian Ministry of Defense, Glossário das Forças Armadas, MD35-G-01, trans. Paulo E. Santa 
Barba (Brasília, DF: 2007), 253.  
40 Richardson, What Terrorists Want, 20. 
41 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 40. 
42 Boaz Ganor, The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: a Guide for Decision Makers (Piscataway, NJ: 
Transaction Books, 2008), 17. 
43 Schmid, ed., The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, 86. 
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 force.44 This definition includes the three elements that are used by most scholars: 
violence, civilians, and political message. 
Another unique aspect of terrorism “is its ability to directly compromise one’s 
sense of personal security.”45 The individuals excluded from the aforementioned 
definition, although they are civilians, are the ones in charge of the decision for the 
employment of force; so, an action against them may be understood as an effort to 
interfere with the decision-making process that has no direct intention of delivering a 
political message. In other words, if the population is not targeted, but only the military 
or government officials, it is not an act of terrorism; it is a different type of crime. In this 
case, as Ganor implies, there is no intention of changing the assessments and principles of 
the persons of a society—who are concerned about their welfare caused by the sense of 
insecurity—in order to make them pressure the government to react as the terrorists want. 
Finally, the main difficulty of not having a consensual definition of terrorism is that it 
makes it difficult to achieve international cooperation,46 a crucial point in the fight 
against terrorist organizations or networks. The United Nations, for instance, has not 
reached a consensual definition of the term yet. 
Modern terrorism, which does not respect borders, makes use of globalization, 
state failure, and technology to spread the problem throughout the globe. In our time, any 
nation can fall victim to terrorism, as possible designated targets can be located within its 
borders, even if the terrorist action is not intended to affect the population of the country 
where it is committed. More important is to keep in mind that “terrorism, however 
defined, has always challenged the stability of societies and the peace of mind of 
everyday people.”47 
44 For instance, an attack against the Secretary of Defense is not considered a terrorist action, as long 
as it does not harm civilians. The same applies for an attack conducted against military installations. 
Nevertheless, if a civilian is gravely hurt, the act is automatically defined as terrorism; no “collateral 
damages” are excused. 
45 Ganor, The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle, 255. 
46 Ibid., 2. 
47 Martin, Understanding Terrorism, 3. 
 14 
                                                 
 C. SUBCATEGORIES OF TERRORISM 
The vast literature on terrorism provides many different classifications of the 
subject. Ganor, for instance, provides a model based on religious, separatist, anarchist, 
freedom fighter, and revolutionary typologies.48 Hoffman talks about separatist, 
international, state-sponsored, and religious terrorism.49 Martin divides it into state, 
dissident, religious, criminal, and international terrorism.50 There are also many other 
classifications based on targets, location, psychology, tactics, structure, size, financing, 
and goals of the terrorists. 
As terrorism is an intricate and multidisciplinary subject, all previously mentioned 
divisions are useful if they provide information about the characteristics and peculiarities 
of terrorists that can be used by academics and operators to understand and counter the 
problem. Drawing on the existing literature, this thesis proposes a broader classification 
that focuses on the political goals of the terrorists, followed by the motivation behind 
them. For that reason, at the highest level, terrorism can be characterized as 
revolutionary, secessionist, or resistant (see Figure 1 at the end of this section). One level 
down, these categories further subdivide into religious, ideological, or ethnic. This 
division is important for the next chapter, as it will have different implications on the 
narratives used by the groups and consequently on the terrorists’ will to fight. 
Revolutionaries’ ultimate goals are to create new political orders. They can be 
religiously or ideologically motivated. For instance, Al-Qaeda’s goal is “to establish a 
pan-Islamic Caliphate throughout the world by working with allied Islamic extremist 
groups to overthrow regimes it deems ‘non-Islamic’ and expelling Westerners and non-
Muslims from Muslim countries”51 and its motivation relates to cosmic war, as its 
members believe they are fighting a metaphysical battle between good and evil that is 
happening now and in this world. Sendero Luminoso—Shining Path—and FARC 
48 Boaz Ganor, “Terrorist Organization Typologies and the Probability of a Boomerang Effect,” 
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 4 (2008), 272. 
49 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism. 
50 Martin, Understanding Terrorism, 46. 
51 Global Security, “Al-Qaida/Al-Qaeda (The Base),” 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/al-qaida.htm. 
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 (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia or Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia) are examples of Marxist ideological groups; they seek to create Marxist 
regimes based on a dogmatic platform of agrarian-socialism and anti-imperialism.52 
Secessionists aim to establish a new political community by separating from the 
state they are affiliated with and creating a new autonomous region or state that is self-
governed. Ethnic differences are the main reason for their acts. The IRA—Irish 
Republican Army—the ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna or Basque Homeland and 
Freedom), and the PKK—Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan or Kurdistan Workers’ Party—are 
some examples of ethnic groups that seek political and/or territorial autonomy from the 
states in which they reside. At this point, it is important to note that some groups may 
have more than one motivation. For instance, ethnicity and religion can exist at the same 
time, as in the case of the IRA, but political motivation and the desire for autonomy from 
Britain is the central reason for their actions and supersedes religious motivations such as 
the creation of a theocracy. 
The major goal of resistance terrorism is independence; they seek to expel 
outsiders or invaders from their lands. Their motivation may be related to ideological 
(self-determination) or religious issues. The FLN—Front de Libération Nationale or 
National Liberation Front—during the French occupation of Algeria, the mujahideen 
against the Soviet occupation, and to a certain degree contemporary insurgents in 
Afghanistan are included in this category. Some cases, on the other hand, are difficult to 
discern because there can be a strong religious component in their motivation, even if 
their goals are clearly political, as was the case with Irgun and Lehi in the pre-state of 
Israel, which can be classified as secessionists or resistant movements, depending on who 
is analyzing the groups. Eventually, what really matters is to identify terrorists’ political 
goals and leading motivations. 
52 Emilio Salgari, Marulanda and the FARC for Beginners, FARC-EP Educational Material, 2011. 
http://farc-epeace.org/index.php/component/k2/item/292-marulanda-for-beginners.html 
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Figure 1.  Typologies of terrorism. 
D. TERRORISM AS A SYSTEM 
This thesis addresses terrorism as an open social system. Such a holistic approach 
takes into account not only the interactions within the terrorist organization or network, 
but also its interactions with the environment and the resultant effects on both. In the real 
world, it is quite difficult—not to say impossible—to manipulate one variable of the 
terrorism system while keeping all the others on standby,53 because all of its components 
are interrelated and interdependent. For instance, the loss of control of violence during an 
action—no matter from what side—will impact the will to fight of both sides. A tactical 
move considered good at the start can turn out to be a very bad strategic option. 
As in all open systems, terrorism has “a boundary, an input, an output and a 
throughput function.”54 In other words, terrorism acquires inputs from the environment 
which are transformed into outputs that, in turn, will affect both terrorism and the 
environment.55 According to Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, a systemic approach to 
insurgency offers four ways for conducting counterinsurgency: deny input, diminish the 
efficiency of the production process, raze the insurgency outputs, and reduce its outcomes 
on the environment.56 They stress that the first three options are more productive than the 
53 In the academic world, this is commonly referred as “all other things being equal.” 
54 F. Heylighen, “Basic Concepts of the Systems Approach,” October 14, 1998, 
http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/SYSAPPR.HTML. 
55 Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent 
Conflicts (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1970), 28‒41. 









                                                 
 last one, as they concentrate on the supply side—inputs and throughputs in order to 
minimize the outputs—instead of on the demand side, as suggested by their last method. 
Leites’ and Wolf’s analysis is brilliant, but while it focuses on the material means 
(m) of the inputs, it does not think through (w) as an input. According to Nikos Passas, to 
reduce the inputs of (m) into terrorism is a difficult task: “It is widely agreed that 
individual terrorist operations are surprisingly inexpensive. . . The truth is that such small 
amounts cannot be stopped.”57 To work on the throughputs is also difficult and 
demanding, as it relies on accurate intelligence, particularly if the traditional mindset 
indirectly leads all actions mainly against (m). This is exactly what has been done against 
terrorism, particularly following September 11: decapitation of leadership, body 
counting, and terrorism financing are thought about in terms of (m), even though they 
impact (w). As a result, the current approach cannot solve the problem: to keep (m) 
small—a necessary but insufficient condition58—does not imply that (w) is small as well. 
Based on Richardson’s assertion that terrorists are made, not born,59 it is plausible 
to assume that not only (m), but also (w) comes from the environment into the system as 
an input. The system, in turn, can transform these inputs by increasing their initial 
potential into outputs—such as constructed narratives—and reintroduce them into the 
environment. In this context, all four of Leites’ and Wolf’s methods are important as they 
can provide different levels of contribution to deal with the problem, as long as their 
outcomes are aligned with the strategic goal of reducing (w). Again, it is not only 
important to keep (m) low—what is already pursued by the conventional approach—but 
to make (w) reduce and stay down. 
This chapter showed that terrorism has been a recurring problem during the 
course of human history. The term was defined as it shall be understood in the context of 
57 Nikos Passas, “Terrorism Financing Mechanisms and Policy Dilemmas,” in Terrorist Financing 
and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective, eds. Jeanne Giraldo and Harold Trinkunas (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 31. 
58 Looking at the equation T=mw, one could argue that making m=0 or w=0 would be a sufficient 
condition to solve terrorism. Nevertheless, in the real world, there is probably no way of making m or w=0, 
but to make them small enough to be kept under control. 
59 Richardson, What Terrorists Want. 
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 this thesis, followed by the proposal of broad classifications of terrorism based on its 
political goals and motivations. In order to analyze such a complex phenomenon, this 
paper relies on Bertalanffy’s theory of open systems. Consistent with this theory, the next 
chapter will examine (w) in detail in order to identify the factors that generate it. 
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 III. THE WILL TO FIGHT 
The will to fight is at the nub of all defeat mechanisms . . . 
One should always look for a way to break the enemy’s 
will and capacity to resist. 
 
—Huba Wass de Czege 
 
The study of the will to fight is challenging because it deals with an intangible 
and blurred subject that cannot be quantified with the use of pure metrics. Nevertheless, 
this does not mean that the will to fight cannot be related to tangible and measurable 
variables responsible for its shaping and generation. This chapter defines the term “will to 
fight,” shows the importance of the will to fight for terrorist activities, identifies variables 
that influence terrorists’ will to fight, and offers a model that correlates the will to fight 
with terrorism. 
A. WHAT IS “THE WILL TO FIGHT?” 
As stated before, this thesis assumes Clausewitz’s relationship between the 
enemy’s power of resistance and his will to fight as one of its foundations. In his book, 
Clausewitz also claims that “the strength of his [the enemy’s] will is much less easy to 
determine and can only be gauged approximately by the strength of the motive animating 
it.”60 Hence, in order to define what this thesis denotes as the will to fight it is natural 
that Clausewitz should be used as the starting point. For him, the will to fight is a moral 
factor: 
They [moral factors] constitute the spirit that permeates war as a whole, 
and at an early stage they establish a close affinity with the will that moves 
and leads the whole mass of force, practically merging with it, since the 
will is itself a moral quantity. Unfortunately they will not yield to 
academic wisdom. They cannot be classified or counted. They have to be 
seen or felt [emphasis added].61  
60 Clausewitz, On War, 16. 
61 Ibid., 141. 
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 He continues by suggesting that the will to fight is the “energy, firmness, 
staunchness, emotional balance, and strength of character. These products of a heroic 
nature could almost be treated as one and the same force––strength of will.”62 Simply 
put, the will to fight is an intangible energy that provides determination for fighting; the 
absence of this motivation should result in the end of armed hostilities. 
The Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary describes will as “a strong desire or 
determination to do something”63 and to fight as “to resolve by struggle.”64 Combining 
these definitions, the will to fight is “a strong desire to resolve something by struggle.” 
Henceforth, for the purpose of this thesis, the will to fight is defined as the energy that 
impels an individual, a group, or an organization to resist or struggle against others. 
B. THE RELEVANCE OF THE WILL TO FIGHT 
Academics and leaders acknowledge the importance of the will to fight in 
conflicts. The subject is so relevant that, according to Clausewitz, “the war . . . cannot be 
considered to have ended so long as the enemy’s will has not been broken.”65 Liddell 
Hart maintains that “in war the chief incalculable is the human will.”66 Churchill, in one 
of his famous speeches, said: 
We shall go on to the end, we shall fight in France, we shall fight on the 
seas and oceans, we shall fight with growing confidence and growing 
strength in the air, we shall defend our Island, whatever the cost may be, 
we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we 
shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we 
shall never surrender [emphasis added].67 
  
62 Ibid., 49. 
63 Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, s. v. “will,” http://www.merriam-webster.com. 
64 Ibid., s. v. “to fight.” 
65 Clausewitz, On War, 32. 
66 Hart, Strategy, 337. 




                                                 
 The Brazilian Army recognizes the significance of the will to fight, particularly in 
asymmetric conflicts: 
In short, the strategy of resistance is designed to allow a militarily weak 
opponent to defeat a militarily powerful one. The material inferiority will 
be fully compensated by moral forces, by the undermining of the 
opponent’s will to fight, and by the adoption of innovative strategies and 
tactics. The strong will be defeated as a natural consequence of his fatigue 
(prostration) and due to the loss of his will to fight (psychological 
defeat).68 
Vo Nguyen Giap, after the Vietnam War, declared, “We [North Vietnamese] were 
not strong enough to drive out a half million American troops, but that wasn’t our aim. 
Our intention was to break the will of the American government to continue the war.”69 
In another interview, he pointed out that: 
Your objective in war can either be to wipe out the enemy altogether or to 
leave their forces partly intact but their will to fight destroyed. It was the 
American policy to try and escalate the war. Our goal in the ‘68 offensive 
was to force them to de-escalate, to break the American will to remain in 
the war. . . . We did this by confronting them with repeated military, as 
well as political and diplomatic victories.70 
Abu Mus’ab Al-Suri, the so-called “Architect of Global Jihad,” also highlights the 
will to fight in combat: 
All military schools agree that a will to fight and moral strength of the 
fighter is the basis for victory and good performance. . . . The proof of the 
sincerity of this will is that he makes the necessary preparations for that 
decision . . . . In our situation, which is jihad . . . preparation is the fruit of 
sincere will. When the will is sincere and the determination is firm, one 
starts making preparations according to his capabilities, in order to 
terrorize the enemies of God and the Muslims . . . . This combat will . . . is 
his basic weapon, which moves him to do whatever he is capable of, 
68 Brazilian Army, Estratégia, C124-1, trans. Paulo E. Santa Barba (Brasília, DF: 2001), 2‒9. 
69 Margie Mason and Chris Brummitt, “Legendary Vietnam Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap Dies,” Yahoo 
News, October 4, 2013 (accessed November 3, 2013), http://news.yahoo.com/legendary-vietnam-gen-vo-
nguyen-giap-dies-132952927.html. 
70 People’s Century, “Interview with Vo Nguyen Giap Viet Minh Commander” (accessed November 
3, 2013), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/peoplescentury/episodes/guerrillawars/giaptranscript.html. 
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 [emphasis added] even using civilian weapons, if there is nothing else 
available.71 
Finally, a recent RAND study of 59 core insurgency cases shows the 
preponderance of commitment and motivation (will to fight) in those kinds of conflicts:  
Commitment and motivation refers to the extent to which the government 
and COIN [counterinsurgency] forces demonstrated that they were 
actually committed to defeating the insurgency . . . In all COIN wins, both 
the government and the COIN force demonstrated their commitment and 
motivation, whereas the insurgents won all 17 of the cases in which 
commitment and motivation were assessed as lacking [emphasis added].72 
C. WHERE DOES THE WILL TO FIGHT COME FROM? 
Clausewitz asserts that “[o]f all the passions that inspire man in battle, none, we 
have to admit, is so powerful and so constant as the longing for honour and renown. . . . 
In war they act as the essential breath of life that animates the inert mass.”73 Clausewitz 
is most likely referring to the will to fight of soldiers, not terrorists, although the factors 
may apply to both actors. At this point, nevertheless, it is important to identify and 
organize the variables that generate terrorists’ will to fight based on “terrorist 
organization’s perception and interpretation of the situation”74—according to reasons 
claimed by successful revolutionary leaders and well-known terrorists—and at the 
assumptions of distinguished scholars. 
For Mao the will to fight can be associated with the concept of relative 
deprivation: “Any ideology—even the very best, even Marxism-Leninism itself—is 
ineffective unless it is linked with objective realities, meets objectively existing needs 
and has been grasped by the masses of the people.”75 Also it seems that the issuance of 
71 Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: the Life of al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri (London: 
Hurst, 2007), 469‒70. 
72 Paul et al., Paths to Victory, xviii‒xix. 
73 Clausewitz, On War, 50. 
74 Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics 13, no. 4 (1981): 385. 
75 Mao Tse-Tung and Zedong Mao, “The Bankruptcy of the Idealist Conception of History, September 
16, 1949” in Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, Vol. IV (San Francisco, CA: China Books, 1972), 457.  
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 his “Eight Points for Attention”76 was due to his understanding of the power of revenge 
on man’s determination. In other words, ideology—combined with the sense of perceived 
injustice—and revenge are prompters of the will to fight. 
Latin American Marxist guerrilla fighter Che Guevara wrote in his letters: “My 
Marxism has taken root and become purified. I believe in armed struggle as the only 
solution for those peoples who fight to free themselves, and I am consistent with my 
beliefs. . . .77 I carry to new battlefronts the faith that you taught me, the revolutionary 
spirit of my people, the feeling of fulfilling the most sacred of duties: to fight against 
imperialism wherever it may be.”78 As a result, his will to fight came from a strong belief 
in an ideology and from the fact that he was convinced that he was doing the right thing 
against his enemy: imperial capitalism. For him, culture—the revolutionary spirit of his 
people—seemed also to be an issue. 
The Ayatollah Khomeini claimed that the will to fight for the Iranian Revolution 
came from a religious belief, a perceived injustice, and a nationalist ideology: 
The will of almighty God . . . decreed the release of this oppressed nation 
from the yoke of the tyranny and crimes of the satanical regime and from 
the yoke of the domination of oppressive powers . . . It is our duty to stand 
up to the superpowers and . . . follow the straight path of Islam and 
nationalism. . . . The noble nation should know that the entire victory was 
achieved through the will of almighty God and . . . through the spirit of 
faith and a spirit of self-sacrifice . . .79 
Al-Qaeda strategist Al-Suri states that the motives for terrorism can be religious, 
social or economic.80 He also asserts that some strategic preconditions—geographical, 
76 The referenced points are: speak politely; pay fairly for what you buy; return everything you 
borrow; pay for anything you damage; do not hit or swear at people; do not damage crops; do not take 
liberties with women; and do not ill-treat captives. Mao-Tse Tung and Zedong Mao, “On the Reissue of the 
Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention - Instruction of the General Headquarters 
of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, October 10, 1947” in Selected Works, 155. 
77 Ernesto Che Guevara, Che Guevara Reader: Writings on Politics and Revolution (North 
Melbourne, Australia: Ocean Press, 2012), 384. 
78 Ibid., 387. 
79Ayatollah Khomeini, “We Shall Confront the World with Our Ideology,” in MERIP Reports, no. 88, 
Iran’s Revolution: The First Year (June 1980), 22. 
80 Lia, Architect of Global Jihad, 377. 
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 population, and political factors—are required for success in Open Front Jihad.81 The 
political factors “include the presence of a cause in which the local inhabitants can 
believe, in a way that is sufficient for making them fight a jihad for its sake”82 [emphasis 
added]. For him, in Afghanistan, the motivation for terrorism is religion and tribalism; in 
Chechnya, religion and nationalism; and in Bosnia, religion and survival.83 Therefore, 
based on his view, the will to fight may come from religion, nationalism, culture, and 
self-preservation. 
Martin van Creveld claims that fighters must have a strong motive for risking 
everything by going to war84 and that these reasons are not related to interest—at least 
not to mundane ones—because “dead men have no interests.”85 For him, war is a 
thrilling event and “[f]ighting itself can be a source of joy, perhaps even the greatest joy 
of all.”86 He points out religion as another important source of resolution: “Many 
Christians as well as Muslims believe that their religion obliges them to fight and that it 
will render them bulletproof.”87 Revenge is an extra strong reason: “Not only is revenge 
one of the commonest causes of war, but it is also one of the most powerful and least 
controllable emotions. Taking revenge, we feel that we ‘get our own back,’ as the saying 
goes, compensating for power we have lost and gaining what we did not previously 
have.”88 He provides other examples: “God, country, nation, race, class, justice, honor, 
freedom, equality, fraternity come under the same category of myths for which men are 
prepared to give their lives and for which, in fact, they have always given their lives.”89 
Hence, for Creveld, joy, religious faith, revenge, ideology, ethnicity, honor, and 
perceived injustice are certainly motors of the will to fight. 
81 Ibid., 374‒5. 
82 Ibid., 375. 
83 Ibid., 376‒7. 
84 Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 166. 
85 Ibid., 158. 
86 Creveld, The Culture of War (New York: Presidio Press, 2008), xi. 
87 Ibid., 305. 
88 Ibid., 112. 
89 Creveld, The Transformation of War, 166. 
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 For Crenshaw, “concrete grievances among an identifiable subgroup of a larger 
population, such as an ethnic minority discriminated against by the majority;”90 
perceived injustice: “if terrorists perceive the state as unjust, morally corrupt, and violent, 
then terrorism may seem legitimate and justified;”91 a strong belief in a higher good: 
“they are people who tolerate high risk because of intense commitment to a cause. Their 
commitment is strong enough to make the risk of personal harm acceptable and perhaps 
to outweigh the cost of society’s rejection;”92 the desire for revenge: “single common 
emotion that drives the individual to become a terrorist, it is vengeance on behalf of 
comrades or even the constituency the terrorist aspires to represent;”93 and the lack of 
opportunity for political participation is a motive for terrorism. Hence, it is logical to 
accept that, for Crenshaw, the will to fight is driven by ethnic grievances, perceived 
injustice, solid belief in a cause, and revenge. 
According to Bard O’Neill, the following factors provide the will to fight: hatred, 
revenge, tolerance of violence, historical rivalries, ethnicity, religion, and how just or 
unjust the conflict is perceived to be.94 Revenge, for instance, is referenced as a very 
important factor: “Every time a Russian helicopter gunship strafes a village, every man in 
it will not rest until he has drawn Russian blood.”95 
Brynjar Lia and Katja Skjølberg, citing Corrado, suggest that motives for 
terrorism come from ideologies and values.96 They also mention Wilkinson’s view that 
terrorists’ motivations spring from ideologies and beliefs.97 They continue by saying that 
“explanations for why extremist groups find terrorism useful is the thesis that it results 
from the failure of other attempts to achieve influence, in particular the ineffectiveness of 
90 Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” 383. 
91 Ibid., 390. 
92 Ibid., 393. 
93 Ibid., 394. 
94 O’Neill, Insurgency & Terrorism. 
95 Ibid., 81. 
96 Brynjar Lia and Katja Skjølberg, “Causes of Terrorism: An Expanded and Updated Review of the 
Literature,” Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutts Rapportdatabase (Norwegian Defence Research 
Establishment, 2004), 10. 
97 Ibid., 14. 
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 non-violent means of struggle to address political or ethnic grievances.”98 For them 
“[v]engeance as a motive in terrorism is perhaps more visible when the terrorist 
campaign is well under way, than it is at its onset.”99 Lia and Skjølberg indicate that 
relative deprivation and inequality are also causes of terrorism.100 In short, the will to 
fight may derive from ideologies, values, beliefs, ethnic problems, and perceived 
injustice. 
For Rapoport, terrorists’ motivations are captured in four distinct waves. “As their 
names—‘Anarchist,’ ‘anticolonial,’ ‘New Left,’ and ‘Religious’—suggest, a different 
energy drives each.”101 In other words, revenge, perceived injustice, ideology, ethnic 
problems, and religion102 are forces that have motivated generations of terrorists to fight 
for their causes; they have created the will to fight. He also implies that these energies 
have different levels of influence on the will to fight and religion is probably the 
strongest. “Each [prior wave] was inspired by a secular cause, and a striking 
characteristic of religious communities is how durable some are.”103  
For Ganor the motives for terrorism can be “religious, political, social or 
economic.”104 Religion, for instance, is considered a strong driver: “their [Islamic 
terrorists] motives, as reflected in their radical religious ideology and their belief in God’s 
command to disseminate their version of religion throughout the world using aggressive 
means . . . make international terrorism the most serious strategic threat to global peace 
and safety of the world.”105 He also points out that it may be a “direct result of feelings 
of humiliation and anger for nationalist or social reasons, or in light of a personal-family 
experience.”106 Another solid factor can be “a result of a momentary whim, generally 
98 Ibid., 15. 
99 Ibid., 17. 
100 Ibid., 70. 
101 Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” 47. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid., 66. 
104 Ganor, The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle, 24. 
105 Ibid., 293. 
106 Ibid., 36. 
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 motivated by a desire for revenge”107 or what he calls a boomerang effect. “Hamas 
spokespersons . . . have threatened from time to time that their organizations plan to 
dispatch ten suicide bombers in revenge for a ‘targeted killing’ operation.”108 In other 
words, religion, honor, ideology, and revenge are probable sources of the will to fight. 
According to Bjørgo, there are various levels of causes of terrorism: structural 
(people do not necessarily grasp the influence of such causes in their lives); facilitating 
causes (“make terrorism possible or attractive, without being prime movers”);109 
motivational causes (“the actual grievances that people experience at a personal level, 
motivating them to act”);110 and triggering causes (the immediate prompters).111 
Although all of these causes may have an impact on the will to fight, motivational causes 
seem to be the ones that are directly related to its genesis. Bjørgo asserts that religion, 
nationalism, ethnicity, revenge, honor, and personal satisfaction are some terrorists’ 
motives;112 in other words, they are the basis of their will to fight. 
Richardson summarizes terrorists’ motivations in three words: revenge, renown, 
and reaction.113 Slicing up the first two words, she asserts that revenge and glory are 
some of the factors that motivate terrorism. “Those who become martyrs appear to do so 
out of a combination of motives: anger, humiliation, a desire for revenge . . . and a desire 
to attain glory.”114 Honor is pointed out as another variable: “An insurgent was adamant 
that we had to defend our honor no matter what the cost.”115 She emphasizes religion as a 
107 Ibid., 79. 
108 Ibid., 257. 
109 Bjørgo, ed., Root Causes of Terrorism, 3‒4. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid. Bjørgo provides some examples: structural causes (demographic imbalances, globalization, 
rapid modernization, transitional societies, increasing individualism with rootlessness and atomization, 
relative deprivation, class structure); facilitator causes (the evolution of modern news media, transportation, 
weapons technology, weak state control of territory); triggering causes (momentous or provocative events, 
a political calamity, an outrageous act committed by the enemy, or some other events that call for revenge 
or action). 
112 Ibid. 
113 Richardson, What Terrorists Want. Reaction, in this case, is not a motive for the will to fight. 
114 Ibid., 15. 
115 Ibid., xvii. 
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 very significant driver. “Religion serves to incite, to mobilize, and to legitimize terrorist 
actions. Moreover, religions’ preoccupation with fundamental notions of good and evil 
tends to ensure that movements with religious motives are much less prone to 
compromise.”116 Perceived injustice is also another motive. “It is not so much a vision of 
a new world, therefore, that drives even the leaders of these [terrorist] groups but rather 
their outrage at the injustices of the present one.”117 This factor is stressed in a quote 
from a Palestinian prisoner in Israel: 
In your [Israeli] occupation you never distinguish between man and 
women, or between old people and children. You adopted methods of 
collective punishment . . . You set up detention camps for thousands of 
people in sub-human conditions. You destroyed homes and turned 
children into orphans . . . . Given that kind of conduct, there is no choice 
but to strike at you without mercy in every possible way.118 
A strong belief in a cause motivates as well. “They [IRA] were motivated by a 
desire to right wrongs and to do their best for a noble cause.”119 Ideology is also 
embedded: “Nationalism has never ceased in its attraction to those prepared to fight for 
the ‘freedom’ of their group.”120 Hence, for Richardson, revenge, glory, honor, religion, 
perceived injustice, ideology, and the belief in a cause prompt terrorists’ will to fight. 
Hoffman presents vengeance, ideologies, ethno-nationalism, racial intolerance, 
and religion as motivations for terrorism.121 He emphasizes that religious motivations for 
terrorism have “often led to more intense acts of violence that have produced 
considerably higher levels of fatalities than the relatively more discriminating and less 
lethal incidents of violence perpetrated by secular terrorist organizations.”122 Hoffman 
also highlights revenge as a strong factor. “The abuse that ordinary people suffer at the 
hands of the army [is] the primary motivating factor to join the [Tamil] Tigers [in Sri 
116 Ibid., 68. 
117 Ibid., 88. 
118 Ibid., 93. 
119Ibid., xv. 
120Ibid., 238. 
121 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism. 
122 Ibid., 88. 
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 Lanka].”123 Hence, it is reasonable to assume that for him the will to fight may be 
engendered by a desire for revenge, ideology, ethnic problems, and religious beliefs. 
Anna Simons asserts that “[c]orporate loyalty, spiritual hunger and the need to 
prove moral worth are just some of the drives that can inspire acts of self-sacrifice.”124 
She also points out adolescence as a motivator for terrorism, as some young men are 
naturally attracted to violence, particularly when they seek social recognition.125 Quoting 
two prominent Native Americans, Simons shows that ideology is also another factor: 
“Better to die as an Indian than live as a white man.”126 Their will to fight, in this case, 
came from the belief that “what they were defending was the only right or true way to 
live.”127 So, for Simons, the will to fight may originate in by loyalty, religion, honor, 
adolescence, and ideology. She also suggests that these motivators provide different 
levels of willpower by highlighting that “ideology has never equaled religion as a 
motivating factor for believers.”128 
For Gerard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin, the Roman overreaction against the 
Zealots only created the desire for revenge. “On several occasions, the Roman army 
captured hundreds of rebels, who were tortured before being put to death in the most 
painful ways possible. Far from cooling the ardor of the Zealot fighters, such reprisals 
seem only to have galvanized the men and women in their ranks.”129 They also point out 
ideology as a source of the will to fight. “It is also true, however, that a nationalist cause 
is generally much more powerful in motivating people than a social issue, and all else 
being equal, the intensity of violence stemming from nationalistic sentiments is therefore 
123 Ibid., 140. 
124 Anna Simons, “Making Enemies: An Anthropology of Islamist Terror, Part I,” The American 
Interest (Mount Morris: The American Interest, 2006), 8. 
125 Ibid., 8‒11. 
126 Ibid., 14. 
127 Ibid. 
128 Simons, “Making Enemies: An Anthropology of Islamist Terror, Part II,” The American Interest 
(Mount Morris: The American Interest, 2006), 40. 
129 Chaliand and Blin, eds., The History of Terrorism, 58. 
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 usually greater than that generated by socioeconomic grievances.”130 For them, religion 
is also a fountain of the will to fight; “the religious point of reference was long central to 
most societies, and this phenomenon has not yet exhausted itself.”131 
In “Winning Hearts and Minds: A Social Influence Analysis,” Anthony Pratkanis 
states that perceived injustice is a strong driver of the will to fight: 
The perception of an injustice is one of the strongest motivations for 
encouraging attacks, including aggression and war. . . . As a core human 
motivation, people attempt to restore justice, including resorting to 
violence and aggression, especially when the injustice is perceived as a 
threat to one’s self-worth (Baumeister and Boden 1998). The history of 
warfare is the history of the perception of injustice, whether the injustice 
be real, manufactured, or imagined.132  
Frank Barrett and Theodore Sarbin claim that revenge is another solid originator: 
Humiliation was indeed a motivator for Marwan. He was inspired to 
become a suicide bomber after he witnessed an injustice: he said that in 
April 2003 he saw U.S. soldiers fire on a crowd of demonstrators at a 
school, killing twelve and wounding more. He sought revenge, and 
eventually he was linked with Islamic radicals and was socialized into 
jihadist ways: ‘I read about the history of jihad, about great martyrs who 
have gone before me. These things strengthen my will.’133 
In addition, David Ronfeldt pinpoints honor as a variable:  
As individuals, families, clans, and tribes as a whole assert their place and 
maneuver for position, maximizing honor—not power or profit—is 
normally their paramount motivation. . . . [W]arlords and warriors fighting 
in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other tribal zones are renowned for the value 
130 Ariel Merari, “Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency,” in The History of Terrorism: From 
Antiquity to al Qaeda, eds. Gerard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin (University of California Press, 2007), 39‒40. 
131 Chaliand and Blin, eds., The History of Terrorism, viii. 
132 Anthony R. Pratkanis, “Winning Hearts and Minds: A Social Influence Analysis,” in Information 
Strategy and Warfare: A Guide to Theory and Practice, eds. John Arquilla and Douglas A. Borer (New 
York: Routledge, 2007), 70. 
133 Frank J. Barrett and Theodore R. Sarbin, “The Rhetoric of Terror: ‘War’ as Misplaced Metaphor,” 
in Information Strategy and Warfare: A Guide to Theory and Practice, eds. John Arquilla and Douglas A. 
Borer (New York: Routledge, 2007), 27. 
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 they place on upholding codes of honor and avoiding shameful 
humiliation.134 
For Martin, perceived injustice and the desire for revenge are sources of 
motivation for terrorism as “radicalized sentiment grew out of frustration with the slow 
pace of change and the violent reaction of some of their opponents.”135 Ethnic 
differences are another cause, particularly for the ETA, IRA, and the Palestinians,136 
since historical events such as “massacres, forced migrations, or extended repression can 
affect them for generations.”137 Moral convictions, an “unambiguous certainty of the 
righteousness of their cause,”138 codes of self-sacrifice, and ideological utopias are 
pointed to by him as possible causes.139 Hence, it is logical to deduce that, for Martin, 
perceived injustice, revenge, ethnic differences, moral convictions, codes of self-
sacrifice—in other words, honor—and ideology are potential generators of the will to 
fight. 
Alex Schmid provides many motives for terrorism: revenge, demands, 
propaganda/attention, overreaction, disruption, desire for martyrdom, morale building; 
elimination of opposing forces, and extortion of money.140 The ones that can be more 
closely related to the will to fight are revenge and strong religious belief (as in seeking 
martyrdom). In another section of the book, he claims that “[t]he motivations to engage in 
terrorism cover a broad range, including redress for alleged grievances, personal or 
vicarious revenge, collective punishment, revolution, national liberation and the 
promotion of diverse ideological, political, social, national or religious causes and 
objectives.”141 He sums up by listing 48 possible root causes of terrorism asserted by 
134 David Ronfeldt, “Al-Qaeda and its Affiliates: A Global Tribe Waging Segmental Warfare,” in 
Information Strategy and Warfare: A Guide to Theory and Practice, eds. John Arquilla and Douglas A. 
Borer (New York: Routledge, 2007), 37. 
135 Martin, Understanding Terrorism, 65. 
136 Ibid., 68. 
137 Ibid., 65. 
138 Ibid., 82. 
139 Ibid., 82‒90. 
140 Schmid, ed., The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, 6. 
141 Ibid., 87. 
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 more than 200 experts. The variables more directly related to the will to fight are: giving 
the powerless a sense of power, revenge, a culture of martyrdom, extreme ideologies, 
perceived injustice, disappointment over the likelihood of political change through non-
violent means, nationalism, intolerance, and the belief in narratives of historical 
events.142 
Another aspect that needs to be analyzed is the relationship between economics 
and terrorists’ will to fight, particularly because poverty as a root cause of terrorism is a 
very controversial theme among scholars. According to Schmid, although many United 
Nations speakers pointed out poverty as a root cause of terrorism right after the 9/11 
terrorist attacks, many experts claim that such a theory is “ill-founded and 
misleading.”143 Jitka Malecková, for instance, states that “the evidence on both the 
individual and the national level [of our research] indicated that there is no direct 
connection between poverty and terrorism, at least in the case of international terrorist 
activities.”144 On the other hand, citing Hudson, Malecková mentions that: 
Increasingly, terrorist groups are recruiting members who possess a high 
degree of intellectualism and idealism, are highly educated, and are well 
trained in a legitimate profession. However, this may not necessarily be 
the case with the younger, lower ranks of large guerrilla/terrorist 
organizations in less-developed countries, such as the FARC, the PKK, the 
LTTE [Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam], and Arab groups, as well as 
with some of the leaders of these groups.145 
For Ted Robert Gurr “[p]overty per se is not a direct cause of terrorism.”146 He 
continues by stating that “[m]ilitant movements frequently draw on what Bjørgo calls 
fellow-travelers and criminals—people motivated by social needs and pressures and 
142 Ibid., “Appendix 4.1 Psychological, Political, Economic, Religious and Cultural (Root) Causes of 
Terrorism, According to Scholars Gathered at the Club de Madrid Conference of 2005,” 272‒4. 
143 Ibid., 16. 
144 Jitka Malecková, “Impoverished Terrorists: Stereotype or Reality,” in Root Causes of Terrorism: 
Myths, Reality and Ways Forward, ed. Tore Bjørgo (New York: Routledge, 2005), 41. 
145 Ibid., 39. 
146 Ted Robert Gurr, Addressing the Causes of Terrorism: The Club de Madrid Series on Democracy 
and Terrorism, Volume I (Madrid: 2005), 19. 
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 chances for personal gain rather than ideology.”147 Hence, economic incentives as 
generators of the will to fight do not imply that poverty is a root cause of terrorism; it 
means that some individuals are prone to join terrorist groups for greed or as a way to 
make a living.148 Army Major Keith Boring, during a 2012 interview at the Combat 
Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth, explained how Al-Qaeda was “employing” people 
to lay improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Iraq: 
With al-Qaeda, they were very good with propaganda, themes of common 
culture and common language—a lot of those are actually economic, they 
also pay people. ‘Here’s $100. Dig a hole for me. Don’t ask why.’ There 
was high unemployment there; anyone would go for a job so being paid 
$100 just to dig a ditch—one guy digs a ditch and the other guy gets $100 
or $50 just to—’Here’s a box, just put this in the ditch.’149 
The aforementioned example shows that terrorist groups sometimes use financial 
incentives as a recruiting tool for their ranks, including mercenaries—as some Russians 
fighting in Syria—that act for greed or poor people who may perceive the situation as a 
means of subsistence. This latter motivation seems to be the case of some FARC 
members. According to Jeanie Gong, “Particularly for those living in extremely poor 
areas of the country, becoming a guerrilla fighter can be a more attractive option than 
other alternatives. For some, the FARC provides a way to escape from a dead-end 
life.”150 Gurr, citing Gold, indicates that “[e]conomics is not just about whether 
economic variables can help explain observed outcomes. It is most fundamentally about 
how human behaviour is shaped by the interaction of incentives and constraints.”151 As a 
147 Ibid., 20. 
148 Narcotraffickers, Mafia, and Yakuza and other criminal organizations commonly designated as 
“criminal terrorist organizations” are not included in this situation, as the violence they use is motivated by 
greed, not for political purposes. 
149 Mark Thompson, “IEDs, C.O.D.,” TIME.com, February 22, 2013, 
http://nation.time.com/2013/02/22/ieds-c-o-d/. 
150 Jeanie Gong, “FARC – Rebels with a Cause?” Council on Hemispheric Affairs, July 6, 2010, 
http://www.coha.org/farc-%E2%80%93-rebels-with-a-cause/. 
151 Gurr, Addressing the Causes of Terrorism, 19. 
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 result, it is logical to conclude that financial reasons (greed or poverty) are prompters of 
the will to fight152 for some terrorists. 
Table 1 summarizes the variables and the number of times each one was cited. 
Although perceived injustice is mentioned many times, it is not considered a particular 
factor, but one that is embedded in the first four: 
 
Nr Factor Occurrences 
1. Religion 12 
2. Ideology (Marxism-Leninism, nationalism) 15 
3. Ethnicity 8 
4. Revenge 12 
5, Values (honor, loyalty, moral) 10 
6. Renown (glory) 2 
7. Joy (includes adolescence) 2 
8. Culture 3 
9. Financial incentives (greed or poverty) - 
Table 1.   Variables of the will to fight. 
Cultural factors do not seem to be a generator of the will to fight, but a variable 
that influences it in different degrees, depending on the cultural group that is the subject 
of study. According to Ruth Benedict,  
The diversity of cultures can be endlessly documented. A field of human 
behaviour may be ignored in some societies until it barely exists; it may 
even be in some cases unimagined. . . . standards, no matter in what aspect 
of behaviour, range in different cultures from the positive to the negative 
pole. . . . A culture, like an individual, is a more or less consistent pattern 
152 It can be argued that the same thing happens with defense or security forces of the State. Not all in 
the military join their services due to beliefs—mainly nationalism—but some do for economic purposes. 
This occurs not only in poor countries where conscription is mandatory and military payment sometimes is 
the highest available in the market, but also in developed and rich countries that rely on volunteers to fill in 
their ranks. 
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 of thought and action. Within each culture there come into being 
characteristic purposes not necessarily shared by other types of society.153  
She continues by stating that each culture “responds” differently to specific 
situations, particularly to war. According to Benedict, “All the miscellaneous behavior 
directed toward . . . warring . . . is made over into consistent patterns in accordance with 
unconscious canons of choice that develop within the culture.”154 Benedict provides two 
examples of how cultural differences affect the perception of the same situation: “They 
[the Japanese] also admire certain forms of violence and direct action and private revenge 
which Americans do not”155 and “Giri [duty to ‘clear’ one’s reputation of insult or 
imputation of failure]156 to one’s name and all the hostility and watchful waiting that 
accompany it in any culture, however, is not a virtue that is characteristic of the Asiatic 
mainland. . . . The Chinese do not have it, nor the Siamese, nor the Indians.”157 
In line with Benedict, Crenshaw states that “social myths, traditions, and habits 
permit the development of terrorism as an established political custom,”158 and Creveld 
argues that “generations that have not themselves been involved in the fighting are often 
at a loss to understand what their predecessors got so excited about and shed their blood 
for.”159 Therefore, it is valid to conclude that culture influences the will to fight by 
increasing, reducing, or delaying its growth over time and that its value is unique for each 
culture. 
Based on all of the above, this work assumes that the will to fight can, in a 
broader sense, be created by the belief in a cause, be it a religion, an ideology, ethnicity, 
or values; a desire for revenge; and the search for satisfaction (renown, joy, or financial 
incentives). Religious and ideological beliefs tend to hinge on perceived injustices, as 
153 Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture (1934; repr., New York: Mariner Books, 2005), 52‒3. 
154 Ibid., 54. 
155 Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture (1967; repr., 
New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2006), 82. 
156 Ibid., 73. 
157 Ibid., 92. 
158 Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” 382. 
159 Creveld, The Transformation of War, 167. 
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 culture (c) 
does revenge (see Figure 2). Culture alone is not considered to be a generator of the will 
to fight, but a factor that influences the predisposition to employ violence when faced 




Figure 2.  The variables of the will to fight. 
  
















 D. MODELING THE WILL TO FIGHT 
For Sun Tzu and Clausewitz, warfare is, most of all, an art. However, this does 
not mean that elements of science do not or cannot exist in the realm of war. In this case, 
such components can be used to support the art of war, as stated by Captain Francis V. 
Greene in 1883: 
War is, above all things, an art, employing science in all its branches as its 
servant, but depending first and chiefly upon the skill of the artisan. It has 
its own rules, but not one of them is rigid and invariable. As new 
implements are devised new methods result in its mechanical execution, 
but over and above all its mechanical appliances it rests upon the complex 
factors of human nature, which cannot be reduced to formulas and 
rules.160 
The use of science to analyze conflicts is so attractive because it can provide—or 
at least it intends to—tools for comparing one’s own capacity with the enemy’s, thereby 
reducing some of the uncertainties embedded in waging prolonged fighting. But can this 
view be applied to terrorism? To quantify or compare numbers of people, doctrines, 
equipment, and weapons is relatively easy; to measure one’s will to fight or behavior 
seems to be a completely different challenge. Furthermore, the multidimensional 
character of the will to fight, as described in the previous section, suggests that it cannot 
be evaluated based on a single variable nor can it be isolated from other factors present in 
the real world. Nevertheless, as Clausewitz said, “The will [to fight] is not a wholly 
unknown factor; we can base a forecast of its state tomorrow on what it is today.”161  
This thesis’ primary assumption about terrorists’ power of resistance (T) can be 
stated as: 
T mw=  
where  
• m denotes the terrorists’ resources; and 
• w is the strength of their will to fight. 
160 U.S. Army, Urban Operations, FM 3–06 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006), 
4–1. 
161 Clausewitz, On War, 17. 
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 In the spirit of Clausewitz, we offer the following function to capture the 
relationship of the important variables that determine the will to fight:  
( ) t ttw f b r s c= + +  
where  
• b denotes the summation of all beliefs (religious, ideological, ethnic, and 
values) at time t; 
• r is the desire for revenge at time t; 
• s is the summation of the desires for satisfaction (renown, joy, and 
finances) at time t; and 
• c represents culture at time t. 
With some initial values, b0 for belief, r0 for the desire for revenge, and s0 for the 
desire of satisfaction, the value of wt can be calculated over time for each t ∈ {1,2,3,...}. 
The very first time a terrorist action occurs demands the existence of a minimum 
amount of will to fight—a critical value (wc)—and sufficient resources (see Figure 3): 0 < 𝑤𝑐 < 𝑤 and 0 < 𝑚𝑐 < 𝑚 
where 
• mc denotes the terrorists’ minimum amount of resources to conduct 
terrorist actions; and 
• wc is the minimum amount of will to fight in order to resort to terrorism. 
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Figure 3.  Terrorism areas. 
Therefore, as long as w<wc, there will be no terrorism. The will to fight can also 
be expressed as a function of time:  
1t t t tw w a w+ = +  
where 
• at is the result of the impacts of terrorists’ actions (terrorist attacks, pro-
narratives, etc.) and environmental actions—from the state or any other 
player (attacks against terrorists, counter-narratives, security measures, 
etc.)—on terrorists’ will to fight at time t; it may be a positive or a 
negative value; and 
• wt is a measure of terrorists’ will to fight at time t. 
 
With some initial values, w0 for the will to fight and a0 for the overall impact of 
the actions, the value of wt can be calculated over time for each t ∈ {1,2,3,...}. 
Based on the aforementioned equations, it is logical to conclude that the only 
ways of diminishing (w) is by decreasing (b), (r), (s), or (c) values or by making at < 0. 
Moreover, inasmuch as w<wc, terrorism should not occur at all. Hence, once the 
generators of the will to fight have been identified, it is possible to seek actions that can 
make the above variables decrease across time in order to mitigate terrorism. 
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 This chapter began by explaining the expression “will to fight.” Then, the 
significance of the term for terrorism was highlighted and the variables responsible for 
generating such willpower were pinpointed. In the final section, a simple model for the 
will to fight was presented. In the next chapter, Sendero Luminoso’s will to fight is 
analyzed according to the suggested model. 
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 IV. AN ANALYSIS OF SENDERO LUMINOSO’S WILL TO 
FIGHT 
A habit cannot be tossed out the window; it must be 




The Sendero Luminoso—Shining Path—is considered to be one of the most 
violent Latin American insurgent groups that have resorted to terrorism. This chapter 
presents a historical overview of Peru and the Sendero Luminoso, identifies the 
prompters of the organization’s will to fight and how this will has changed over time, and 
analyzes the effect of government responses to the group’s will to fight. 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
In order to understand the framing processes162 that the Sendero Luminoso used 
to mobilize and gain support, it is important to outline the history of Peru beginning with 
the Spanish conquest of the Incan Empire. 
Spanish conquistador Francisco Pizarro captured Incan Emperor Atahualpa—the 
last Sapa Inca163—in the Battle of Cajamarca in 1532164 and killed him the following 
year. The outcomes were devastating for the natives, also called Amerindians: the Incan 
social structure collapsed, the northern highlands people were completely 
162 In Social Movement Theory framing processes are “the collective processes of interpretation, 
attribution, and social construction that mediate between opportunity and action.” Doug McAdam, John D. 
McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, “Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Framing Processes Toward a 
Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on Social Movements,” in Comparative Perspectives on Social 
Movements (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 2‒3. 
163 In Quechua, unique leader or only emperor. The Sapa Inca was the head of all civil, military, and 
religious powers. Barbara A. Somervill, “Society, Inca.” Empire of the Inca, Great Empires of the Past. 
New York: Facts On File, 2005. Ancient and Medieval History Online. Facts On File,  
http://www.fofweb.com/History/MainPrintPage.asp?iPin=GEINC022&DataType=Ancient&WinType=Fre
e. 
164 Osprey Publishing, “The Battle of Cajamarca (16 November),” 
http://www.ospreypublishing.com/articles/the_battle_of_cajamarca_16_november. 
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 demoralized,165 and political and economic power was transferred from Cuzco to Lima, 
Peru’s newly created capital, in 1534. The Spanish Crown established the Viceroyalty of 
Peru in 1543 and soon the encomienda166 was adopted; in other words, many natives 
were not only converted to the Catholic faith, but also forced into slavery. 
In 1569 Viceroy Francisco de Toledo reorganized the administration of the 
territory. He destroyed the Incan State of Vilcabamba in the Peruvian jungle and executed 
the “last legitimate legal threat to Spanish rule in the Andes,”167 the Incan Emperor 
Túpac Amaru. Toledo gathered the Amerindians in reducciones—villages created to 
concentrate and to reposition them—in order to better “take care of the natives.”168 He 
also altered and reintroduced the mita,169 so there would always be workers for the 
mines. According to Melissa Dell, “The mita required over 200 indigenous communities 
to send one-seventh of their adult male population to work in the Potosí silver and 
Huancavelica mercury mines.”170 For Montero, the “mita has been considered the worst 
example of forced labour ever since the struggle for independence.”171 
165 The “Inca state was vulnerable to decapitation; the structure was incapable of functioning in the 
absence of its keystone.” George Kubler, “The Behavior of Atahualpa, 1531‒1533,” Hispanic American 
Historical Review (1945), 425‒6. doi:10.2307/2508231. 
166 Encomiendas were “a grant of land by the king to loyal subjects, principally the early 
conquistadores, that carried with it the assigned labor of Indians.” The landholder, or encomendero, “had 
two obligations to the Crown: to turn the Indians on the encomienda into good Catholics and to protect 
them. As long as the encomendero fulfilled these duties, he was allowed a free hand to use Indian labor and 
to demand payments for himself from the Indians.” Christine Hunefeldt, A Brief History of Peru (New 
York: Infobase Publishing, 2004), 43. 
167 Christopher Minster, “Biography of Túpac Amaru,” About.com, 
http://latinamericanhistory.about.com/od/theconquestofperu/p/tupacamaru1.htm. 
168 Hunefeldt, A Brief History of Peru, 53. 
169 The mita was a form of tax paid to the Inca that was most commonly done with transitory and 
rotational work. “Mita laborers served as soldiers, farmers, messengers, road builders, or whatever needed 
to be done.” Discover Peru, “Economy of the Inca Empire,” http://www.discover-peru.org/inca-economy-
society/. 
170 Melissa Dell, “The Persistent Effects of Peru’s Mining Mita,” Econometrica 78, no. 6 (November 
2010), 1863. 




                                                 
 The treatment that was given to the Amerindians finally resulted in the rebellion 
of José Gabriel Condorcanqui, better known as the Túpac Amaru Rebellion, in 1780.172 
Despite the killing of Túpac Amaru in 1781, the war against Spain continued for two 
more years. Even after Peru’s Independence in 1824, the natives were still excluded from 
the political power, which was only transferred from the Spanish peninsulares to the 
creole elites of the new country,173 a situation that did not considerably change in the 
following century.  
The city of Ayacucho, Sendero’s birthplace, although founded in 1540, was 
connected to the rest of the country by road only in 1924.174 In short, highland and inland 
individuals (mostly Amerindians) were constantly ignored or marginalized by the elites 
(for the most part white creoles living at the coast); this was a fact that not only split the 
country in two different cultures but also created a “disparity between the prosperous 
coastal cities and the impoverished highlands.”175 
B. THE SENDERO LUMINOSO 
Sendero Luminoso is a group of Maoist ideologues whose goal is to overthrow 
the government of Peru and replace it with a communist-peasant administration. This 
revolution is to be done based on the following strategic goals: “Convert the backward 
areas into advanced and solid base of revolutionary support; attack the symbols of the 
bourgeois state; generalize violence and develop a guerilla war; conquer and expand the 
bases of support; and lay siege to the cities and bring about the total collapse of the 
state.”176 
172 Encyclopaedia Brittanica, s. v. “Viceroyalty of Peru,” 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/453253/Viceroyalty-of-Peru. 
173 Mongabay.com, “Peru,” http://www.mongabay.com/reference/country_studies/peru/all.html. 
174 Ron Buikema and Matt Burger, “Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path),” United States Army Special 
Operations Command, Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II – 1962‒2009, 54. 
175 Cynthia McClintock, “Why Peasants Rebel: The Case of Peru’s Sendero Luminoso,” World 
Politics 37, no. 1 (October 1984), 48‒84, quoted in Buikema and Burger, “Sendero Luminoso,” 51‒3. 
176 David Scott Palmer, “Rebellion in Rural Peru: The Origins and Evolution of Sendero Luminoso,” 
Comparative Politics 18, no. 2 (January 1986), 127‒146, quoted in Buikema and Burger, “Sendero 
Luminoso,” 57. 
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 In 1959, the Peruvian government reopened the University of San Cristóbal de 
Huamanga in the city of Ayacucho.177 Three years later, Manuel Rubén Abimael 
Guzmán Reynoso—nom de guerre President Gonzalo—became a professor of 
philosophy at the institution. Taking advantage of the fact that the school was a “haven 
for radical political discussion, focused on Marxist principles,”178 he started to preach his 
Marxist ideology to the students. At this time, Guzmán belonged to the Communist Party 
of Peru–Red Flag.179 
Believing that the only way to overthrow the state was through the employment of 
armed struggle, Guzmán broke with the party to found the Communist Party of Peru–
Sendero Luminoso180 in 1970. By then, as the university’s director of human resources, 
he was able “to hire loyalists and like-minded individuals to positions of influence in the 
university and the local community.”181 In 1975, Guzmán was ousted from the university 
and moved his efforts to the deprived provinces, without losing his links with his 
sympathizers at Huamanga.182 It is important to mention that his former students were 
becoming “teachers and local leaders in these same impoverished provinces.”183 
Guzmán used his abilities as a speaker184 and charismatic personality to exploit 
natives’ beliefs,185 and the fact that Ayacucho was “geographically, socially, and 
economically marginalized”186 to make Sendero Luminoso grow.  
177 The University was founded by the archbishop Don Cristóbal de Castilla y Zamora in 1677 and 
closed in 1886. Universidad Nacional de San Cristóbal de Huamanga, “Reseña,” 
http://www.unsch.edu.pe/portal/la-universidad/resena-historca.html. 
178 Buikema and Burger, “Sendero Luminoso,” 54‒5. 
179 Orin Starn, “Maoism in the Andes: The Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path and the Refusal of 
History,” Journal of Latin American Studies 27, no. 2 (May 1995), 404. 
180 This name was taken “from the maxim of the founder of Peru’s first communist party, José Carlos 
Mariátegui: ‘El Marxismo-Leninismo abrirá el sendero luminoso hacia la revolución’ (‘Marxism-Leninism 
will open the shining path to revolution’). Encyclopaedia Brittanica, s. v. “Shining Path,” 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/540794/Shining-Path. 
181 Buikema and Burger, “Sendero Luminoso,” 55. 
182 Ibid. 
183 Ibid. 
184 Starn, “Maoism in the Andes,” 404. Guzmán’s famous ability to persuade—or brainwash—granted 
him the nickname of Dr. Shampú (Dr. Shampoo).   
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 On March 17, 1980, Guzmán started a sequence of covert meetings in 
Ayacucho—the Central Committee’s second plenary—that consolidated the overall 
guidance for the group to get out of the shadows and cross “the irreversible step over the 
threshold.”187 This happened exactly two months later, with the burning of “ballot boxes 
on the eve of the Presidential elections, in the town of Chuschi, Ayacucho.”188 After a 
series of successful attacks in the first three years of action, the initial 300 members of 
Sendero Luminoso increased about tenfold.189 
From 1983 to 1992, the group expanded its area of operations and support bases, 
making its presence known in 114 provinces of the 195 that exist in the country.190 This 
was also the time when the group made its first indiscriminate use of terrorism by killing 
69 peasants with the purpose of “‘exemplary punishment’ because they [local people] 
rebelled against this organization [Sendero Luminoso] and helped government forces in 
the fight against subversion;”191 this was an episode that came to be known as the 
Lucanamarca Massacre. 
Sendero made vast use of terrorism to disseminate fear across Peru. For instance, 
individuals who refused to cooperate were put through notorious “people’s trials.” 
According to an Ayacucho Catholic priest, in some of these judgments “peasants were 
stripped and tied to a post in the center of the village, while the villagers, including 
women and children, were forced to cut a piece of flesh from the victim. This torture 
185 Some Sendero Luminoso members thought Guzmán was one of their promised gods who had 
returned to fulfill the ancient prophecies. Buikema and Burger, “Sendero Luminoso,” 58. 
186 Ibid., 55. 
187 Gustavo G. Ellenbogen, Shining Path: A History of the Millenarian War in Peru (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 21. 
188 Executive Intelligence Review, “Shining Path: Core of the RIM Project,” November 17, 1995, 
http://www.larouchepub.com/other/1995/2246_sendero.html. 
189 Buikema and Burger, “Sendero Luminoso,” 56. 
190 Ibid., 62. 
191 Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, “La Masacre de Lucanamarca (1983),” trans. Paulo 
E. Santa Barba, August 2003, 44. 
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 would continue until the victim died from blood loss or shock.”192 Terrorism was also 
used for recruitment purposes: “One method of recruitment by fear occurred when 
parents were murdered in front of their children, who were then forced to eat their 
parents’ tongues.”193 
On September 12, 1992, Guzmán and two other leaders of the Sendero Luminoso 
were captured in Lima by DINCOTE agents—Dirección Nacional Contra el Terrorismo 
or National Direction against Terrorism—together with many archives of the party.194 
This event became a watershed in the organization’s history. According to Hunefeldt, 
“Although domestic terrorist activities did not completely subside after this, the country 
suffered much less from terrorist attacks and the fears they inspired.”195 One and a half 
years later, more than 3,500 Sendero Luminoso members were captured.196 Moreover, 
when Guzmán appeared on television calling on his followers for negotiation and peace 
talks with the government at the end of 1993, Sendero Luminoso later split into two 
factions: the “Acuerdistas” (the ones who followed Guzmán) and the “Proseguir,” who 
decided to continue with the armed struggle.197 
Although the Proseguir faction of Sendero Luminoso is still in operation, the 
group has never fully recovered from the “decapitation” of its main leading light, 
Guzmán. Óscar Ramírez Durand—Comrade Feliciano, the last free member of the 
Central Committee—who emerged as the new leader of the group after Guzmán’s arrest, 
was also captured by Peruvian Commandos in 1999.198 In 2012, Florindo Eleuterio 
192 U. S. Congress. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere 
Affairs, The Shining Path After Guzman: The Threat and the International Response, quoted in Buikema 
and Burger, “Sendero Luminoso,” 61. 
193 Buikema and Burger, “Sendero Luminoso,” 68. 
194 The investigations that led to Guzmán’s capture were “based on the discovery of medicine for 
psoriasis, from which Guzman was known to suffer, cigarette stubs from Guzman’s favorite brand, and 
chicken bones (Guzman enjoyed Peruvian roast chicken).” Buikema and Burger, “Sendero Luminoso,” 73. 
195 Hunefeldt, A Brief History of Peru, 258. 
196 Buikema and Burger, “Sendero Luminoso,” 73. 
197 Esteban Valle-Riestra, “¿Es el MOVADEF el brazo legal de Sendero Luminoso?,” La Colmena, 
May 20, 2012, http://lacolmena.pe/es-el-movadef-el-brazo-legal-de-sendero-luminoso/. 
198 CNN.com, “Shining Path Leader Taken Without a Shot,” July 14, 1999, 
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/americas/9907/14/peru.path.02/index.html?iref=newssearch. 
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 Flores Hala—Comrade Artemio—was captured in the Peruvian jungle near Puerto 
Pizana, which resulted in the collapse of the faction located in the northern part of 
Peru.199 But some factions that operate in the VRAEM200 (Valle del Río Apurímac, Ene 
y Mantaro; or Apurímac, Ene, and Mantaro River Valley) are still active.201 
C. PROMPTERS OF SENDERO LUMINOSO’S WILL TO FIGHT 
As all open systems, Sendero Luminoso is under constant influence from external 
environmental factors. Guzmán’s arrest in 1992 and his decision to negotiate with the 
government the following year bewildered the organization and led to a split between 
those who believed they were wrong—the arrepentidos or repented—and those who 
wanted to keep fighting—the proseguir, or “Go On.” This defining moment suggests the 
drawing of a line separating Sendero’s will to fight before and after 1993. 
1. From 1970 to 1993 
Although there is no consensus among specialists on the reasons that drove the 
members of the Sendero Luminoso to employ violence to overthrow the state, it is 
possible to identify the least controversial ones. Andrea Portugal, citing Macera, states 
that the root causes were due to: 
the persistence of the colonial order. . . daily abuse against the Andean 
world had been lived as a reproduction of conquest and domination up to 
and including the present day, engendering and accumulating resentment 
and hatred for centuries, which had translated into a desire to harm the 
exploiter and everything that he represented, but also in a hope for radical 
change.202 
199 The Guardian, “Peruvian Troops Capture Shining Path Leader,” February 13, 2012, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/feb/13/peruvian-troops-capture-shining-path-leader. 
200 The VRAEM encompasses five provinces from four departments: Ayacucho, Apurímac, Cuzco, 
and Huancavelica in an area of about 41,000 km2, where more than 500,000 people live in extreme poverty. 
There are 345 Amerindian communities from the Machiguenga, Ashaninka, and Nomatsiguenga ethnic 
groups living in the area. José C. Cabrera, “Organización del CCFFAA,” trans. Paulo E. Santa Barba 
(lecture, Escuela Superior de Guerra del Perú – Escuela de Postgrado, Lima, 2012).  
201 Katie Micklethwaite, “The Shining Path: Battered, but Unbroken,” Americas Quarterly, September 
5, 2013, http://americasquarterly.org/content/shining-path-battered-but-unbroken. 
202 Andrea Portugal, Voices from the War: Exploring the Motivation of Sendero Luminoso Militants 
(University of Oxford, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE), 2008), 
6. 
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 In other words, their will to fight was related to a desire for revenge brought on by 
a perceived injustice—exploitation and exclusion—that started right after the Spanish 
conquest. 
For Degregori, Senderistas’ willpower came from the belief in an ideology, 
because, even though Degregori denies “the possibility of teachers, young students and 
peasants sharing a common horizon of ideas, feelings and motives,”203 he acknowledges 
that what all of them wanted mostly was social order, something that could only be 
delivered by Marxism-Leninism. 
Galindo states that Sendero’s will to fight was related to religious beliefs. He 
claims that Christianity influenced the Amerindians to create “‘the Andean utopia’, which 
idealized the Inca Empire as a regime of justice and wealth and created an expectation of 
re-establishing this glorious past. As with Christian notions of the Final Judgment and the 
return of Christ, this new order would only be possible after a period of chaos and total 
destruction led by a messiah.”204 For many, Guzmán was the promised one.205  
Portugal states that, for Portocarrero, the belief in Marxist ideology and religion, 
the desire for revenge against historical oppression, and joy were the originators of 
Senderistas’ will to fight.206 She also highlights that, for Henríquez, their willpower came 
from the ideological belief in Marxism-Leninism as the cure for their psychosocial and 
economic problems and the desire for revenge their perception of “exclusion and 
injustice.”207 
For Portugal, who researched on testimonies of imprisoned Senderistas collected 
by the Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación (Truth and Reconciliation Commission - 
CVR),208 the initiators of Senderistas’ will to fight can be traced to the desire for revenge 
203 Ibid., 9. 
204 Ibid. 
205 Ibid., 10. 
206 Ibid., 11. 
207 Ibid. 
208 It is important to mention that not all individuals studied in Andrea Portugal’s research were 
identified as members of the Sendero Luminoso. 
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 against perceived social injustices—class discrimination and oppression that led to lack 
of opportunities and extreme poverty to the highlanders. Furthermore, Senderistas 
responded to the initial government overreaction, the belief in the Marxist-Leninist 
ideology as the only way to solve their difficulties, and the cult of Guzmán.209 
Buikema and Burger state that the organization was able to combine “Maoism 
with ‘Andean millennialism’, suggesting the perceived golden era of the Incan reign.”210 
The belief in Guzmán was similar to a cult. The Senderistas believed he “was shrouded in 
mystery, a charismatic, almost hypnotic leader, who held the one true vision of the future 
and the means to achieve it. In their minds, he was almost superhuman and his commands 
were obeyed without question or hesitation.”211 They also point out “notions of injustice, 
racial resentment, economic disparity . . . a sense of government neglect by highland 
mestizos and Indians tied to racial inequalities”212 that could only be solved by the 
recreation of a new Marxist-Leninist government as the motivations of the organization’s 
will to fight. 
Based on the previously mentioned description and on what was exposed in 
Chapter III, it is logical to conclude that the most important sources of Sendero 
Luminoso’s will to fight during this period were due to religious and ideological beliefs, 
the desire to avenge historical oppression and exclusion, and the search for economic 
satisfaction, especially escape extreme poverty (see Figure 4). 
209 Portugal, Voices from the War, 27‒39. 
210 Buikema and Burger, “Sendero Luminoso,” 55. 
211 Ibid., 58. 
212 Ibid., 65. 
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Figure 4.  Main sources of Sendero’s will to fight from 1970 to 1993. 
2. From 1994 to the Present 
The arrest of Guzmán was a hard shock to an organization whose members 
believed he was the Promised One. His call for peace negotiations with the government 
only made things worse, a fact that resulted in a loss of the will to fight in many of those 
who used to believe in him. Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that the belief in Guzmán 
was once important but is no longer an important source of the will to fight of 
Senderistas. Since they are still active, there must be other reasons that impel them to 
employ violence against the government. 
According to Portugal, Proseguir members still believe in the Marxist-Leninist-
Maoist ideology as the only way to solve the problems of the country. She states that 
imprisoned members say that “as long as injustices and poverty exist, problems will not 
be solved . . . children will grow up with resentment . . . [and] rise up again.”213 
Furthermore, according to the Peruvian government, current day Senderistas: 
Though not entirely without ideological motivation, [emphasis added] the 
VRAE faction has explicitly abandoned Guzman’s teachings and is deeply 
involved with coca base production and sale to international drug 
traffickers primarily from Colombia. . . . [With] its increased focus on 
213 Portugal, Voices from the War, 63. 
Sendero's will to 
fight (w) 
belief (b) 
cult of Guzmán 
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satisfaction (s) improve financial life (escape poverty) 
 52 
                                                 
 drug trafficking, the group no longer focuses its efforts on instigating 
political change in Peru. Instead, the VRAE faction’s main concern is 
protecting its lucrative drug processing and smuggling activities from 
government interference.214 
The Peruvian Armed Forces also acknowledge that the Senderistas “are not only 
Sicarii, [they are] watchmen, narco trafficking businessmen, and participants of other 
illicit activities,”215 and they still have not lost their Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology 
and political objectives. They also do not recognize Guzmán as their leader.216 
The magazine Diálogo claimed the following about Sendero Luminoso in 2012: 
“With no ideological leadership, the group became more militant and turned to drug 
trafficking, resembling the Colombian guerrilla organization, the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC).”217 Similarly, Geoffrey Ramsey claims that “the VRAE 
Shining Path have had a reputation as being less politically motivated . . . and more 
involved in the drug trade.”218 In other words, Sendero’s motivation is now primarily 
financial. Such assertions are controversial, particularly because the group may have 
returned to the initial phase of its Maoist campaign, making use of illicit activities to 
acquire funds and rebuild itself. Nevertheless, greed is still a strong motivation of human 
behavior, particularly for those closely managing the money. 
An important point that must be mentioned is the fact that not too much has 
structurally changed in the VRAEM region of the country since the inception of Sendero 
Luminoso. According to Portugal, although the situation in the highlands is not as bad as 
when Sendero Luminoso started its campaign,  
Peru is a country with high levels of poverty and profound inequalities. . . . 
Poverty and extreme poverty are much higher in rural areas, at 72.5 and 
40.3 per cent, respectively. The capital city of Lima lies in the coast and is 
214 Embassy of Peru in Washington, DC, “Peru Targets the Remnants of the Shining Path,” May 3, 
2012, http://www.embassyofperu.org/peru-targets-the-remnants-of-shining-path/. 
215 Cabrera, “Organización del CCFFAA.” 
216 Ibid. 
217Diálogo, “Old Enemy, New Strategy,” vol. 22, no. 1 (January 1, 2012), 52. 
218 Geoffrey Ramsey, “Shining Path Hold Political Rally in Rural Peru,” Sight Crime: Organized 
Crime in the Americas, August 15, 2012, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/shining-path-political-
vrae. 
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 the centre of economic growth, while the Sierra [Mountains]—once the 
prosperous empire of the Incas—and the Selva [Jungle] constitute the 
poorest regions of the country, with levels of poverty around 80 per 
cent . . .219 
The government also recognizes that there are still many problems in the inlands 
and highlands of the country. For instance, in the VRAEM region, while half of the 
people live in poverty conditions, the other half subsists in conditions of extreme poverty; 
in other words, virtually all of the people struggle with day-to-day living. Furthermore, 
the state is absent or fails to provide services in key areas. For example, there is a lack of 
basic infrastructure services, such as healthcare, education, and communication and 
transportation systems, more than 40% of children suffer from malnutrition, and the most 
important available sources of finance come from agriculture, particularly the cultivation 
of cocaine.220 There are still lots of grievances related to the feeling of exclusion and 
abandonment by the state that are subject to Sendero’s manipulation. 
In short, the central prompters of Sendero Luminoso’s will to fight at the present 
time (see Figure 5) appear to be based on an ideological belief (Marxism-Leninism-




Figure 5.  Main sources of Sendero’s will to fight from 1994 to the present day. 
 
219 Portugal, Voices from the War, 28. 
220 Cabrera, “Organización del CCFFAA.” 
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 D. THE EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO SENDERO 
LUMINOSO’S WILL TO FIGHT 
Based on the model proposed in Chapter III, if the Peruvian government wanted 
to diminish (w), it should have devised measures aimed to decrease the existing values of 
(b), (r), and (s) at time (t) while simultaneously employing actions against (m) that would 
not have created second or third order effects that would increase (w). Hence, from 1980 
to 1993 (t), the government should have tried to diminish the cult of Guzmán and the 
Marxism-Leninism-Maoism ideology (b), government oppression (r), and improve 
financial life – escape poverty (s). From 1994 to the present day (t), it should have 
worked to reduce the Marxism-Leninism-Maoism ideology (b) and improve financial life 
– escape poverty and greed (s). 
When Sendero Luminoso launched its campaign in May 1980, it did not receive 
much attention.221 The government initially assumed that the organization was not an 
actual menace to the country, so the decision made was to employ special police units, 
known as Sinchis, to deal with the law-enforcement problem.222 The Sinchis were not 
suited to the task and their undiscriminating use of violence worked for the Senderistas, 
who saw their membership grow with many people seeking revenge against these 
government forces.223 Moreover, the group’s initial success influenced their will to fight 
in a positive way. As a result, the government’s answer to the problem only made the 
value of (r) grow. 
In 1983, similar to what initially happened to Brazil in the Araguaia region and 
Colombia in Marquetalia, the government decided to employ massive numbers of 
conventional military forces to fight against Sendero Luminoso. The troops overreacted 
not only against the very small number of Senderistas they found, but mostly against the 
local population, who then was not only terrorized by the Sendero Luminoso, but also by 
the military. “Thousands of civilians were killed, tortured, kidnapped, or simply 
221 Ellenbogen, The Shining Path, 18. 
222 Buikema and Burger, “Sendero Luminoso,” 69. 
223 Ibid. 
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 disappeared (las desapariciones) during the conflict.”224 Once again, the desire for 
revenge sprouted in many, sparking their will to fight. Thus, this approach only 
contributed to increase (r) values.  
At this point, it is important to highlight that the discrepancies between the 
populations who lived in the cities and the ones in the countryside were not only real, but 
were also not sensed by the citizens dwelling in the capital. According to Buikema and 
Burger, “For Peruvians living in Lima and other urban areas, the lesson learned related to 
how different the lives of native Indians in the Andes were from their own. Many spoke 
of ‘the two Perus.’”225 This assertion confirms that the government’s actions did not 
undermine Sendero’s belief in Marxism-Leninism as the only way to overcome the status 
quo, but in fact reinforced it. 
In 1986, following a mutiny in three prisons in Lima, “the army entered the jails 
and slaughtered inmates, even after the terrorists had surrendered”226 and added more 
fuel to the group’s desire for revenge. Moreover, such actions mostly worked for the 
Senderistas, who were winning the battle of the narrative; people in Lima started to 
believe the government was doing exactly as described by Sendero’s discourse. By the 
end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, their will to fight was probably at its 
peak. As it had done before, the government’s response only increased the values of (r). 
Interestingly, in the late 1980s the Peruvian government began to shift its strategy 
against Sendero. The state discharged thousands of corrupt officials, initiated select 
operations with a discriminate use of force, and established an efficient network of 
human intelligence, “while touting the economic and security improvements that the 
government had been implementing.”227 This counter-narrative campaign was conducted 
at the same time Sendero was shifting its focus from the countryside to the cities. At this 
224 Ibid., 70. 
225 Ibid. 
226 Hunefeldt, A Brief History of Peru, 242. 
227 Buikema and Burger, “Sendero Luminoso,” 70. 
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 point, government actions began to be consistent with its discourse.228 At least during 
this phase, government actions did not increase (r) values. 
The turning point of Sendero Luminoso’s will to fight was Guzmán’s arrest in 
1992. Guzmán, the messiah who used to consider “himself a superior being, comparable 
to a semi-god,”229 suddenly became an ordinary man not only to his followers, but also to 
himself. Moreover, when he cried out to the Senderistas to accept an agreement with the 
government, many considered him a traitor,230 something unacceptable for a comrade, 
much less for a living god. Many members who worshipped him joined the arrepentidos 
and decided to leave the group, as often happens when cult leaders cannot deliver on their 
promises. At the same time, it must be highlighted that the data obtained in Guzmán’s 
arrest led to the “capture of 3,600 SL [Sendero Luminoso] insurgents in the following 18 
months.”231 This government action put an end to the cult of Guzmán (b) and, for the 
most part, the desire for revenge (r). Nevertheless, the smallest component of b 
(Marxism-Leninism-Maoism) and (s) were not broken. 
The group’s will to fight seems to have increasingly and rapidly diminished from 
1992 to 1993. From 1994 to 2004 it remained low, but not to a point below the critical 
level where terrorism does not occur. In the words of Gordon McCormick, the Peruvian 
government has achieved a strong win, but it did not follow on with measures that could 
definitely end the problem.232 After 2004, the group’s will to fight appears to have been 
slowly and gradually increasing (see Figure 6 later in this chapter). The group’s 
motivation also seems to have changed: the small and precise operations of the Peruvian 
commandos have not sparked the appearance of (r) anymore; (b) is related to Marxist-
Leninist ideology; and (s) is not only due to the desire to escape poverty, but also to 
greed. 
228 Many of these measures were due to the influence of the United States support that began in 1988. 
229 Portugal, Voices from the War, 17. 
230 Ibid., 18. 
231 Buikema and Burger, “Sendero Luminoso,” 73. 
232 Gordon H. McCormick, “The Complete Win,” in Gangs and Guerrillas: Ideas for 
Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism, eds. Michael Freeman and Hy Rothstein (Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2011), 3. 
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 It seems that the Peruvian government still believes that a “decapitation” strategy 
will be the solution for Sendero Luminoso, as it seemed to be the case when Guzmán was 
captured. The arrests of subsequent leaders suggest that this is what is actually 
happening: in 1999 Feliciano was the target; in 2012, it was Artemio. Last September 
was Gabriel’s and Alipio’s turn.233 Nevertheless, Sendero Luminoso is still active and its 
membership is estimated at 500 people.234 Although the Peruvian government publicized 
its concern with the VRAEM problems,235 in reality the problem is still being treated as a 
military one. The only institutions that truly direct their efforts to the region are the 
Armed Forces; the other instruments of statecraft do not fully participate,236 either 
because officials do not want to work in the area or due to a lack of interest. 
In summation, there is still no holistic approach to deal with Sendero. The 
inconsistency between the government’s message and government’s actions will never 
lead to what McCormick calls a complete victory: “A complete win, finally, involves not 
only pushing the enemy across his breakpoint and gaining control over one’s political 
environment, but resolving the underlying social and political factors that gave rise to an 
organized opposition in the first place. A player wins, in this case, by eliminating his 
adversary’s motivation to resist.”237 Similarly, in the words of Max Manwaring: 
If the Peruvian government does not deliver meaningful political, 
economic and social change and reform to its people, and if the Peruvian 
people cannot see Abimael Guzman’s Leninist concept of “true 
democracy” for what it really is, then demagogues, populists, warlords, 
233 Katie Micklethwaite, “The Shining Path: Battered, but Unbroken,” Americas Quarterly, September 
5, 2013, http://americasquarterly.org/content/shining-path-battered-but-unbroken. 
234 Yasmin Calmet and Diego Salazar, “VRAEM: Políticas de Seguridad Pública en Zona de 
Conflicto,” 7th Latin-American Congress of Political Sciences – ALACIP, Bogotá, September 25‒27, 2013, 
http://www.academia.edu/4690597/Vraem_Politicas_de_Seguridad_Publica_en_zona_de_conflicto. 
235 Peru released the Plan Estratégico Integral Territorial VRAEM 2013–2016 (Territorial 
Comprehensive Strategic Plan) establishing many directives to solve the structural problems of the region 
and integrate the area to the rest of the country. The area is receiving government attention since the 
implementation of Plan VRAE in 2006. 
236 Calmet and Salazar, “VRAEM: Políticas de Seguridad Pública en Zona de Conflicto.” 
237 McCormick, “The Complete Win,” 3. 
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 drug lords, criminals and regional insurgent organizations like the Shining 
Path will sooner or later compete for control of the failing state.238 
 
Figure 6.  Sendero Luminoso’s will to fight over time. 
This chapter presented Peru’s historical problems and how Sendero Luminoso 
skillfully used these grievances to create its narrative to spark the group’s will to fight. 
The group’s will was strengthened by government actions, which fed their ideology and 
desire for revenge, and only began to decrease with a change in military strategy to one 
that positively engaged the population and helped lead to the capture of Guzmán. Despite 
this progress, the government has not achieved a complete win and the group persists 
today. The next chapter will offer concluding thoughts based on this discussion and 
recommendations for states to mitigate terrorists’ will to fight. 
  
238 Max G. Manwaring, “The Resurgence of Peru’s Shining Path,” World Politics Review, February 
22, 2011, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/7959/the-resurgence-of-perus-shining-path. 
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 V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is not because things are difficult that we do not dare, it 




This thesis set out to explore terrorists’ will to fight and the variables that affect 
that willpower. The theoretical literature on terrorism does not directly address the 
subject, creating a critical gap in the conditions that allow terrorism to flourish and 
possible counterterrorism strategies. The study of the will to fight has been understudied 
most likely because it is a blurry and a difficult concept to measure, not to mention that 
the results found will also reflect some degree of subjectivity. Moreover, an approach that 
focuses on attacking the root causes of the problem is controversial, because these 
strategies take time and the outcomes will most likely be realized only in the long run.  
Despite all these difficulties, this thesis sought to answer the following questions: 
What gives terrorists the will to fight? Can this will be eroded and will this result in a 
reduction of terrorism? 
In order to answer these questions, this thesis built upon Clausewitz’s maxim that 
one’s power of resistance is the product of one’s means times the strength of his will239 
and started with the prime assumption that terrorists’ power of resistance is a product of 
terrorists’ resources times the strength of their will to fight. Drawing on Bertalanffy’s 
theory of open systems, this thesis proposed critical variables and a causal statement for 
the conditions under which terrorists’ will to fight is created. Then it used the Sendero 
Luminoso as a case study to test the theory’s explanatory power for the will to fight. 
The theoretical findings suggest that the will to fight is a function of a belief in a 
cause, be it a religion, an ideology, ethnicity, or values; a desire for revenge; a search for 
satisfaction (renown, joy, or financial incentives), and culture. Beliefs, revenge, and 
satisfaction are the generators of the will to fight while culture is a variable that 
influences the susceptibility of an individual, a group, or a network to resort to violence 
239 Clausewitz, On War, 16. 
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 under certain conditions. Consequently, to diminish terrorists’ will to fight it is necessary 
to decrease the values of these variables in the equation.  
This thesis used the variables in the proposed causal argument in Chapter III to 
test the rise and fall of the Sendero Luminoso over a period of three decades. This 
investigation found that Sendero’s will to fight suffered substantial changes in this 
period. From the group’s inception until the capture of Guzmán in 1993, Sendero’s 
willpower was based on religious and ideological beliefs, the desire for revenge, and the 
search for economic satisfaction, particularly the escape from extreme poverty. From 
1994 to the present day, the drivers of the group’s will to fight became the belief in an 
ideology and the search for economic satisfaction (the escape from extreme poverty and 
greed). These findings suggest that religious beliefs and the desire for revenge were the 
most important prompters of Sendero’s will to fight, as their reduction almost put an end 
to the group. 
Due to the fact that every action or inaction taken by the state or terrorists may 
have an impact on terrorists’ will to fight, the examination of terrorism requires holistic 
thinking. The undiscerning use of force in terrorism can be as productive as cutting off 
one of hydra’s heads. For instance, in the Peruvian case, the initial indiscriminate use of 
violence by government forces increased Sendero Luminoso’s desire for revenge, while 
Sendero’s first accomplishments contributed to increasing the group’s will to fight by 
reinforcing Sendero’s beliefs. 
The will to fight can be worn down, a fact that will certainly result in a decline of 
terrorism. Nevertheless, decreasing the value of only some of the variables of the will to 
fight may not be enough to adequately tackle the problem. The capture of Guzmán 
certainly put an end to Sendero’s belief in him as the Promised One. Furthermore, the 
judicious use of violence by government forces reduced Sendero’s desire for revenge, 
actions that significantly mitigated terrorism in the subsequent years. Nevertheless, the 
Peruvian State failed to take measures to diminish Sendero’s belief in Marxism-
Leninism-Maoism and Sendero’s search for satisfaction (especially to escape poverty). In 
military terms, the government failed to exploit its initial success and push the values of 
the will to fight below the critical level. 
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 As occurs with all open systems, terrorists’ will to fight may significantly change 
over time. This fact forces the state to continually recalibrate its assessment of the drivers 
of terrorists’ willpower, as well as of the second and third order effects of its overall 
actions. In the case of Peru, the government failed to perceive that Sendero Luminoso’s 
will to fight was further influenced by the appearance of a new variable in the equation: 
greed. The emergence of terrorism as a means of gaining wealth, particularly through the 
drug trade, required the government to adapt to this new context; ultimately, it did not 
and Sendero has persisted.  
In summation, this thesis recommends the following approaches for governments 
to take to mitigate terrorists’ will to fight.  
First, it is important to try to understand what the problem really is, always 
keeping in mind that each case of terrorism is unique; there is no “one size fits all” 
solution. Then, the identification of key variables and their level of influence in the 
equation of terrorists’ power of resistance are the next issues that need to be addressed. 
Once the variables of the will to fight have been identified, an adequate approach to deal 
with the situation can be designed. 
Second, as terrorism requires the existence of critical levels of will to fight and 
sufficient resources, a good strategy should address both factors simultaneously. A 
decline in the will to fight needs to be accompanied by reductions in terrorists’ means. A 
successful strategy needs to provide mechanisms of defense against current threats, 
envision the mitigation of terrorism to tolerable levels, and avert the creation of future 
problems. Therefore, the main focus of a counterterrorism strategy needs to be on 
weakening the will to fight, not just on diminishing the means—as the traditional strategy 
does—particularly because states are neither ubiquitous nor omnipotent and terrorism is 
cheap. As Creveld argues, “The logic of strategy itself requires that the opponent’s 
motives be understood, since on this rests any prospect of success in war.”240 
  
240 Creveld, The Transformation of War, 217. 
 63 
                                                 
 Third, it is very important that all instruments of statecraft work in harmony and 
cooperate for such a strategy to work satisfactorily, because terrorism is a problem that 
concerns all instruments of statecraft, not only military power. In fact, some of the drivers 
of the will to fight can only be lessened by non-military departments or ministries, 
especially when some grievances against the state may be legitimate, such as lack of 
public services or access to resources of the state. This was true with Sendero’s followers. 
As Zachary Shore states, “Striking that balance between diplomacy and force is one of 
the keys to prudent statecraft.”241  
Fourth, it is crucial for the state to adapt its strategy in response to significant 
changes as fast as it can. Since terrorism is at least a two-player game, the outcomes of 
every government’s and enemy’s actions need to be constantly evaluated, so corrections 
can be made in a timely fashion. The enemy reacts the way he wants to, not necessarily 
the way the state expects him to. Furthermore, time works mainly against the state, 
particularly for the ones not fighting on their own soil. As pointed out by Henry 
Kissinger, “The conventional army loses if it does not win. The guerrilla wins if he does 
not lose.”242 
The fact that the state’s machine is not, by design, structured to adapt quickly 
imposes a problem for successful counterterrorism strategies. In the case of the military, 
the most resilient and capable tool of rapidly adjusting to changing situations is its special 
operations forces. Accordingly, such elements, in conjunction with intelligence assets and 
other selected instruments of statecraft, should be the primary military forces to be used 
in a good counterterrorism strategy. As pointed out by Sun Tzu, “One must adapt oneself 
to the enemy’s changing posture as naturally and as effortlessly as flowing water winding 
down a hillside . . .”243 
241 Zachary Shore, Blunder: Why Smart People Make Bad Decisions (New York: Bloomsbury 
Publishing, 2008), 27. 
242 Henry A. Kissinger, “The Vietnam Negotiations,” Foreign Affairs, no. 48/2 (January 1969), 214, 
quoted in Beatrice Hauser, “Introduction,” in Clausewitz, On War, xxvii. 
243 Sun Tzu, The Art of Warfare, ed. and trans. Roger T. Ames (New York: Ballantine Books, 1993), 
58. 
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 Fifth, states should stay consistent across time in order to establish trust with the 
population, even though this may be quite difficult for democracies. Sudden changes of 
strategy may generate confusion among and inside instruments of statecraft as well as 
with the population. Moreover, a state’s actions need also to be consistent with its 
discourse; a state cannot preach one thing and do another or fail to fulfill its 
commitments. Such postures do not contribute to the effort of mitigating terrorists’ will to 
fight; to the contrary, this may only reinforce terrorists’ narratives. 
Lastly, it is very important not to overreact in the face of a terrorist attack. The 
indiscriminate and excessive use of violence by the state will strengthen terrorists’ desire 
for revenge and hence increase their will to fight. Such an obvious observation may seem 
unnecessary; nevertheless, this type of conduct is a very common mistake committed by 
states in fighting terrorism, particularly in the early stages. In line with Sun Tzu, it is 
important to remember that “supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s 
resistance without fighting,”244 even if the wounds cry out for a hasty and massive 
retaliation. 
This study is only a first step. Analyses of other groups’ will to fight need to be 
done in order to see if the model adequately works. The findings of this thesis suggest 
areas for future study that may include distinct analysis of each variable of the will to 
fight, questions that require the examination of a great number of case studies. For 
instance, religious beliefs seem to be very strong drivers of the will to fight and so do 
ideological beliefs against “invaders.” In regard to these drivers of terrorism, the 
following questions can be examined: What should a good approach to decreasing values 
of religious beliefs look like? What is the role of ideological beliefs in terrorists’ will to 
fight? How can ethnical beliefs be tackled? What is the importance of terrorists’ 
narratives for their will to fight? Is it better to counter their narratives or to let them fade 
over time? 
  
244 Ibid., 46. 
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 This thesis does not have the ambition of solving the problem of terrorism. The 
results found are intended to assist decision makers in developing strategies that may 
contribute to moving states that face the problem as close as possible to McCormick’s 
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